



ARMY

JULY 1956
50¢



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF


At the Chrysler Corporation missile plant near Detroit the nose of an Army Redstone missile moves through the assembly line on a "wagon wheel" dolly.



Tail of the Redstone missile receiving its share of the 148,000 feet of electric wiring in a Redstone assembly. This requires 7,000 soldered connections.

**Roll Out the
REDSTONE**

An Army Redstone rolls off the assembly line. Next step is a simulated flight test in which all components of the missile are in operation as a unit for the first time





STEPPING OUT...INTO SPACE!

In the eerie light on the threshold of space an Air Force technician "bails out" of a gondola — *seventeen miles up!* His rate of descent will reach 450 miles an hour before he reaches thicker air where he can safely open his chute. On the ground far below, highly trained specialists are checking a maze of electronic equipment that will record every phase of this operation. It is important that key men involved in

such experimental projects be moved to new assignments without delay. That's why they're flown by the speedy, dependable Scheduled Airlines. Next time you're moving one man or many, call your Scheduled Airlines representative — let him show you how to save transportation money and keep your men **ON THE JOB** . . . not "on the way."

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WESTERN AIR LINES
WIEN ALASKA AIRLINES

DEPENDABLE SCHEDULED SERVICE SAVES MILLIONS OF VALUABLE MAN HOURS FOR THE MILITARY



ON OPERATION DEEP FREEZE, a Sikorsky helicopter flies over the Antarctic volcano Mount Erebus. The commanding officer of the Navy Task Force praised the performance of the four HO4S helicopters on Oper-

ation Deep Freeze. Typical of their accomplishments, one helicopter in a 24-hour period ferried 200 men to the shore base from ships five miles away. No other transportation was possible because of breaking ice.

AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



S-55s FOR SOUTH AFRICA—The South African Air Force has bought two Sikorsky S-55s. These aircraft, with a third now on order, will be used for rescue and other emergency duties. Above, a pilot officer checks controls before takeoff from the Sikorsky plant on a training flight. S-55 type helicopters serve with all armed forces of the U. S. and those of many free nations.



FOR OIL WORK OFFSHORE—Among oil companies using Sikorsky helicopters to speed drilling offshore in the Gulf of Mexico is The California Company. The company recently purchased two new S-55s to join two already flying for the firm off Louisiana. In Gulf operations the S-55s are equipped with flotation gear. Above, one of them flies past Sikorsky's new plant control tower.



HELICOPTER HISTORY



FIRST MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER

In November, 1947, at Quantico, Va., this Sikorsky HO3S became the U. S. Marine Corps' first helicopter. Progressing from such early uses as air-sea rescue, being demonstrated in this photo, the Marine Corps has created new assault tactics built around the mobility of the helicopter and its unique ability to transport men and equipment anywhere. Today, huge HR2S helicopters promise the large scale airlift capability essential for vertical envelopment.

JOINING THE MARINES—This huge twin-engined Sikorsky HR2S assault helicopter topped performance expectations on its recent flight from Sikorsky's Stratford plant to the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Md. It was the first production delivery flight. This helicopter, known as the H-37 in the Army version and as the S-56 in the commercial version, has retractable landing gear and two Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engines. Its speed, range, and payload capabilities reflect marked advances in the art of helicopter design and production.



SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT

One of the Divisions of United Aircraft Corporations

"MISSILE WITH A MAN IN IT"

Lockheed/USAF F-104

World's Fastest Jet

The F-104 *Starfighter*, now in production for the U. S. Air Force, is the most advanced airplane of its type ever developed. *Dimensions*: height, 13 feet, 6 inches; length, 54 feet, 9 inches. *Wings*: knife-sharp, and only 7½ feet from fuselage to wingtip. *Engine*: General Electric J79, which develops more thrust per pound of engine weight than any other turbojet of comparable size. *Electronics system*: new "plug-in" type, to permit quick changes and replacements of components. *Pilot's seat*: downward firing ejection type, the first in a production jet fighter. *High, T-shaped floating tail*: twice as effective in controllability as conventional tail designs. *Armament and top speed*: both are military secrets, but the Lockheed F-104 can overtake and destroy any plane—of any size—known today.

The *Starfighter's* dart-like configuration,

perfected by extensive wind-tunnel tests, permits the F-104 to flash through the sonic barrier, routinely, without a tremor. And even at supersonic speeds the *Starfighter* has unmatched ease and decisiveness of control—because never before have so many advanced design and engineering features been so superbly combined in one aircraft.

Like all Lockheed-built planes, the *Starfighter* has inherent "design flexibility" that makes it readily adaptable to a variety of military requirements—at lowest cost to our government.

Lockheed's leadership in the design and production of military planes, of nine widely different types, stems from its policy of close cooperation with the armed services. In the F-104 *Starfighter* the U. S. Air Force has the world's fastest and deadliest jet—America's "Missile With a Man in It."

Lockheed

AIRCRAFT CORPORATION

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Lockheed Aircraft Service, Ontario, Calif.*

LOOK TO LOCKHEED FOR JET LEADERSHIP, TOO





LOCKHEED'S NEWS COLUMN

Dick Tracy has lost his lead in the electronics race. His wrist radio is surpassed by a new "miniatuerized" TV camera. Small enough to fit into a vest pocket, its "eye" is about the size of a cigarette. Built by Lockheed for research ONLY... (so far)...


Missile Man is promised in the foreseeable future as a civilian development of missile technology. A Lockheed official says that the thousands of scientific and technical people now researching the whole environment of man in connection with missile development will produce civilian benefits beyond the imagination of the layman today. A letter by missile, of course, would get there faster than you could write the letter in the first place...

A **Lockheed Man** is working quietly in a sanctuary abroad on a nuclear engine design that will make headlines world-wide when they take the wraps off. Same man's blueprints on a nuclear contraption so startled top military authorities very early in the nation's atomic program that they locked his patent in a government vault where, for security reasons, it still remains...

Lockheed has been handed a big piece of the much-talked-about ICBM missile that will keep its Missile Systems Division scientists working nights in their new facility near Stanford University — which, incidentally, tripled in size between blueprints and ground breaking...

Beating the heat which tops 250 degrees Fahrenheit at twice the speed of sound is a matter of concern now to engineers of Lockheed's California Division who are working on methods of making airplane skin glass-smooth. Even modern, high-strength dural surfaces approach their temperature limits at these speeds...

Early America makes atomic history this month as Lockheed Georgia Division breaks ground for its new atom-powered plane facility. The 10,000-acre North Georgia site was in the same family ever since the area opened for settlement in the 1840's.




ZERO minus 4 hours! A G-E test missile, still shrouded in the early morning dampness before launching, represents more than a decade of research and development.

THESE G-E CAPABILITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO



BASIC RESEARCH



COMMUNICATIONS



HYPERSONICS

ARMY

At General Electric, George F. Metcalf reports:

New Department to Help Solve Complex Defense System Problems



GEORGE F. METCALF, is General Manager of General Electric's new Special Defense Projects Department, located in Philadelphia, Pa. Mr. Metcalf has had extensive management experience in the military electronics field, both in Government Service and in the General Electric Company's Electronic Division.

Realizing the increased complexity of some of the nation's current defense system problems, General Electric has formed the Special Defense Projects Department. The new department will act as a Company focal point for large, highly complex missile projects. Headquarters for the new department will be located near Philadelphia, Pa. This new department has responsibility for large defense systems that require the combined research, development, and manufacturing resources of many of General Electric's operating departments and laboratories.

Manned by a highly skilled engineering and development staff, the Special Defense Projects Department relies upon

General Electric operating departments and laboratories for many specialized phases of its defense projects.

The Special Defense Projects Department is making significant contributions to America's defense program by focusing the wide range of specialized talents of General Electric on highly complex defense system problems. Section 224-4, General Electric Co., Schenectady 5, N.Y.

ENGINEERS: G.E.'s Special Defense Projects Department is currently expanding its staff of highly skilled engineers and scientists. If you have a background of successful, creative engineering send your qualifications to: Mr. George Metcalf, 3198 Chestnut St., Special Defense Projects Department, General Electric Company, Philadelphia, Pa.

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NEW SPECIAL DEFENSE PROJECTS DEPARTMENT



METALLURGY

JULY 1956



MATHEMATICS



THERMODYNAMICS

ARMY

JULY 1956
Vol. 6 No. 12

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EDITORIAL POLICY

ARMY is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army. ARMY strives to—

Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

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A more powerful version of Cessna's famed L-19, the OE-2 is the first liaison airplane with built-in target-marking capabilities. It also is used as an artillery spotter, to lay communications wire and to drop supplies to troop positions.

The OE-2's 220 m.p.h. dive-speed capability combines with its self-sealing fuel tanks, flak curtain and armored seats to give the Marine pilot maximum protection during combat operations, get him in and out of targets, fast!

The OE-2 meets a specific need. Cessna considers it a privilege to cooperate with the military in planning for today's air age. CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Wichita, Kansas.



For the Marines, a fast flying "work horse"



THE MONTH'S MAIL

Away with 'Sterile Complacency'

• Congratulations for all you are doing to spearhead organization and tactical progress, and up-to-date thinking in general within the Army.

Having just completed the Special Associate Course at Leavenworth, I find your recent issues a much-needed tonic. It is particularly refreshing to read pieces by Generals Taylor, Gavin, and other responsible senior General Staff officers, which indicate that forward thinking may at long last be coming into vogue.

Unfortunately, this kind of thinking does not yet seem to have penetrated down into the Army's educational channels. I have been deeply disturbed to find that so much of CGSC's basic doctrine; and therefore its problem solutions, is hopelessly obsolete in the light of today's weapons capabilities. According to school doctrine, entire army-group operations are still being logically supported from one or two major ports. Huge base depots are located hard by these congested target areas, while ComZ and army maintenance areas are tightly clustered in and around key transportation bottlenecks. Beach facilities are left unused because they are relatively uneconomical, and depots are kept large and target-tempting because administrative control is more efficient that way.

Usually, the enemy is stated to have atomic capability, but he never seems to use it except for an occasional and isolated strike. In school problems I have encountered I have yet to see even the slightest recognition that the enemy could or would carry out simultaneous multiple strikes against our cluttered rear. Our ships and trains come and go, depots mushroom safely, along with the top-heavy logistical staffs that go with them, everyone gets a soft billet, indigenous companionship, and supplies flow freely, and all is right with the world.

To be sure, lip service is paid to the atom in the form of a slight increase in the number of supply points in the army service area, and AdSec duplicates a few key class II-IV depots. The overall impression, however, is that if you just don't think too much about these mass-destruction weapons, they won't bite you. The student who makes bold to wonder

publicly if Cherbourg and Nantes should properly handle ninety per cent of the theater's supplies is made to feel like a naughty little boy for raising the question.

Granted that much more thought and experimentation are yet to be expended on this very great problem before a definitive new doctrine is established. In the

Reader comment on the regimental concept presented by Lieutenant Colonel Elmer Schmieder in our May issue appear on page 56 of this issue.

meantime, however, it hardly seems intelligent to sweep the problem under the rug and pretend it isn't here. Eleven years have passed since Hiroshima, and it seems only reasonable to expect that the more obvious intermediate doctrinal changes should long since have become routine.

We Army enthusiasts in the civil world are finding it hard to hold the Army banner high when it is so weighed down by sterile complacency. I am sure the Army will continue to lack public support and appropriations until the whole organization demonstrates clearly that it is preparing to fight the next war and not the last one.

So cheers for the hot needle you have been so ably applying. And cheers for the new 101st Airborne, the sky cav, the British regimental system which seems to be gaining acceptance here at last, the long-overdue swing back to dignity and responsibility for the junior officer and NCO, and for the many other exciting things now going on that make this fine old institution begin to feel like an army again.

Now let's get the educators and the rear-echelon jockeys thinking ahead too, and maybe we'll be ready when the bell rings.

MAJOR RALEIGH HANSL, JR.
1519 Connecticut Ave NW
Washington 6, D. C.

Inspired Leadership

• In reading Colonel Scruton's "Death and Humor" [April], I could not help

but notice the first three paragraphs and, with all due respect to Colonel Scruton, how misleading they are in part.

To quote: "They tell the tale of the sergeant in the battle of the Argonne. When the time came for the platoon to leave its trench and advance through fire, the men quit on him, wouldn't budge. Striding up and down that trench, the sergeant employed both boot and vocabulary to no avail. The men, as men in combat sometimes will, just cowered, their spirit gone. Suddenly the sergeant leapt to the parapet and bellowed: 'Come on, you bastards! You want to live forever?' As one man, the platoon was out of that trench following the sergeant through whistling steel, and bayoneted the Germans off the objective. An oft-told tale, this, of inspired leadership. Rather, inspired words of leadership."

First, may I say, sir, that the sergeant referred to in his story was Sergeant Dan Daly of the U.S. Marine Corps and no mention of his name and organization was made. His name is as famous as the words he spoke and never should his name, branch of service, and words be quoted separately. To do so would be the same as saying there was a "man" who conducted an Arctic expedition.

Secondly, it has never been known in our history for any Marine to "quit" on a sergeant, any noncommissioned officer, or officer, nor have we, in our Corps' history, had a Marine to cower and loose their spirit [sic].

As far as the quotation is concerned, may I say, sir, that it too is incorrect in that the word "bastard" was not used by Sergeant Daly but the words "sons of bitches."

In closing may I also state that the words referred to were not "inspired words" of leadership but leadership itself, in the highest form that has been handed down from generation to generation and is as much a part of our New Breed as it was in the Old Corps!

Am enclosing picture and story of Sergeant Daly.

CAPT. W. B. SPRINGFIELD
USMC

Box 269
Texarkana, Tex.

• The best way to comment on this let-

ter is to quote in full our reply to Captain Springfield:

"Dear Captain Springfield:

"Since you say Colonel Scruton failed to quote Sergeant Daly correctly, perhaps it is just as well he didn't identify him.

"You will find, I believe, that expressions similar to those attributed to Sergeant Daly have come out of all wars. I refer you, for example, to page 297 of the one-volume edition of Carl Sandburg's *Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years and The War Years*—in which a Confederate colonel is quoted as having shouted at Malvern Hill: 'Come on, come on, my men! Do you want to live forever?'

"I cannot quite reconcile the fourth paragraph of your letter either with the situation that must have moved Sergeant Daly to have uttered the immortal phrase or with the first word of the clipping you so kindly sent me. In the event you do not have a copy of that clipping the first sentence begins: 'Paralyzed, a handful of dirty, haggard Marines hugged the earth . . .' I have added the italics.

"We appreciate your interest in our magazine."

More Words on Captain Reactionary

• The ever-increasing conflict between special staffs and combat effectiveness is illustrated well in Captain Reactionary's "bad humored" letter and Captain Healy's Cerebration in the May issue.

The sole reason for the soldier's being is effectiveness in combat. To be effective he must be trained to know what to expect, what to do, and how to do it. In addition, he must have confidence in his company officers, and they must have confidence in him.

A special staff's existence is justified when its operations increase both the soldier's and his company officers' combat effectiveness. Otherwise the special staff is not only an expensive luxury, but sabotages combat effectiveness of all concerned through the use of irreplaceable training time.

COLONEL FUNDAMENTALIST

• The editor's note appeared in good taste, which is more than can be said for the letter preceding it, which was apparently scribbled in a moment of suffering from illusions of grandeur.

I agree, however, that offices should be dignified, and therefore approve the removal of cost-of-item stickers. However, as a taxpayer, I agree that some method of influencing cost consciousness is necessary, and if cost-of-item stickers results in savings, I'm all for continuing the program.

The necessity of TI&E is apparent from its commencement at Valley Forge. We Americans are inherently curious and demand to be in the know. The use of the

dayroom for the location of the troop information board appears to be most logical. I doubt that our information displays have ever endangered the proficiency of any pool player. However, recent directives have caused the transfer of the TI&E displays to other locations, so the empty space is now available for dart boards, baseball scores and pamphlets on how to improve your pool skill.

I believe Captain Reactionary's statements are unfounded.

CAPT. MURRAY E. HORTON

Hq & Hq Co, TSB
Fort Benning, Ga.

• Except for minor differences, I am in accord with Captain Reactionary's feelings, and especially his paragraph which starts, "The training of a soldier is total." I ask you: How does TI&E, PIO, Cost Consciousness Programs or Character Guidance Councils save lives in combat?

I believe that if such activities or programs were curtailed or at least limited to their proper place as non-essential training, and the time now spent for them given to the real essentials of military training, our modern Army would more resemble its World War II counterpart and not anything like that in the Cerebration "The Infantry Private of 1970 (Fiscal Year)."

I don't think the editorial comment does credit to either the editor of **ARMY** or his staff. I think someone pulled a boner when he singled out the one bad paragraph of Captain Reactionary's letter to criticize and labeled the entire letter as "bad humor." I think that if a poll were taken among NCOs and company-grade officers today it would prove that such programs meet with marked indifference or disapproval, and do very little toward maintaining that much-needed combat efficiency in the Army.

I can't help wonder out loud: Will this letter meet the requirements for an additional experiment in the therapeutics of printer's ink?

SGT. R. L. CARPENTER

Co E, 8th Inf
APO 39, NYC

• Today I came across my first copy of your very well set up magazine, the May 1956 issue to be exact. I read "The Month's Mail" first. I enjoy these letters in service publications as they are often an excellent forum for new ideas and a reevaluation of old ones.

I was most surprised to find an editorial criticism of a personal nature. . . . Certainly it is proper by editorial note to correct errors in letters you choose to print; however, to make public sport of an officer's honest opinion is not fair play. The fact that you assigned this officer a pseudonym does not improve the matter. . . . Do you expect other officers, particularly junior officers, who are criti-

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HILLER HELICOPTERS
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**COMBAT
BOOTS
FOR THE
HOK**

KAMAN

THE KAMAN AIRCRAFT CORP.
BLOOMFIELD, CONN.

Kaman's general utility helicopter, the HOK, is now in service with the U.S. Marine Corps carrying cargo and personnel on a variety of missions. Equipped with special flotation gear, the HOK converts to an amphibious jack-of-all trades.

To widen the HOK's working sphere to the fullest, Kaman has developed a new type "bear paw" skid landing gear which allows the helicopter to operate from snow, ice, sand and mud. This means that the benefits of the HOK's high altitude performance can now be realized all over the world, regardless of terrain conditions. This development is one more step in the strides Kaman is taking in the interest of National Defense.

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1505 H. Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. Att: General John E. Dahiquist, U. S. A. Ret.

AY Gentlemen: Please forward promptly a free copy of "*The Investment Plan For Capital Accumulation*".

Name _____	Rank _____		
Post or A.P.O. _____	City _____	Zone _____	State _____

ical of the existing system, freely to submit their ideas to your magazine for publication and possible ridicule in print?

Your editorial comment was particularly unfair in that it distorted the one paragraph in several which you chose to lump in their entirety under "bad-humored" and "B-bag."

Captain Reactionary obviously had the best interests of the service in mind when he wrote you. Since you found it necessary to answer his letter I find it strange and unethical that a magazine of your stature should descend to glib personal criticism rather than fairly refuting the charges presented by this officer.

Will you please forward the enclosed copy of this letter to Captain Reactionary?

MAJOR JAMES H. REEDER
USMC

3d MarDiv, FMF
FPO, San Francisco

- For the convenience of Captain Reactionary, I would like to point out that if he is irked by trashy posters, he examine page 36 of DA Pamphlet 355-50, where he will find a list of very fine posters depicting scenes of heroism in our military history. These posters have been available since 1953.

Further, with the exception of three topics chosen by DA for presentation during a quarter, the topics may be prescribed by local and/or unit commanders. Typical of these "Graustarkian" subjects are: "Standards of Conduct," "The Threat to America," and "Citizenship." I might add that TI&E displays in day-rooms are the prerogatives of local commanders.

Perhaps TI&E, Character Guidance and the rest are run by special staff these days because we have too many Captains Reactionary as unit commanders incapable of fitting the old-time concept of the Old Man.

CAPT. TIMOTHY G. DYAS
88-50 198th St
Hollis 23, N. Y.


- Our mail is running about two to one that the editor was bad-humored, overly-excited, and indulging in B-bag criticism of a personal nature when he thrust his editorial barbs into Captain Reactionary. Obviously the therapeutics of printer's ink that we mentioned in that editorial comment reacted adversely on the editor, and to seek relief he hastened a note of apology to Captain Reactionary. A prompt answer, which we quote, restored his spirits:

"Please believe me when I tell you that I was neither offended nor unduly perturbed by your editorial comment. Criticism that appears to be senseless carping annoys most of us and you as an editor are no doubt exposed to far more of it than most of us. And I agree that I chose to use a blunderbuss method of attack vulnerable to justified criticisms in



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itself.

"I regret that Major Reeder unfairly blames you for my use of a pseudonym. My primary reason for this is that I have found too many people interpret any attacks against their programs to be aimed against them personally.

CAPTAIN REACTIONARY"

How to Understand TI&E

- You may be interested in a glossary of terms that will help you understand the meaning of those who criticize the TI&E program:

TI&E is all right in principle, but it isn't being run right. I thought someone up above was supposed to run it—not me.

The subjects picked for the TI&E hour are not worth using. Ask Captain Reactionary to name the last five and you'll quickly discover this means: I don't know what subjects are used, but they probably have picked the wrong ones. Captain Reactionary is typical in that in naming the type subjects TI&E should cover, he listed those they did!

TI&E takes up too much of a commander's time so he can't take care of things like drill, range firing, supply, and so on. Another version of They Ask Too Much of Me, otherwise known to bird-watchers as "the cry of the bird caught short." Translation: I just got gigged for my drill, range firing, supply, and my so on.

There are more important things than TI&E. As this is true of almost anything, including reactionary captains, it is roughly translated as: I don't think it is important at all.

The TI&E program is a waste of time. As I am not a man to waste my time, I have not familiarized myself with it.

I leave that to my TI&E NCO; he knows his job. I don't know what's going on; hope the first sergeant knows who the TI&E NCO is in case they want to talk to him.

We should train our men to be soldiers. I don't know exactly how that's done in detail, but at least the statement is a conversation-stopper in that you can't argue with it. This individual also uses other vague expressions, such as "one hundred per cent Americanism," "the old Army," and "shape up."

Education isn't everything. As this also could be said of anything, real meaning is one of the following: The Old Man just asked why I had more men with a limited education than the other company commanders had, but had done nothing to raise their educational level, or, I don't have much education myself and am self-conscious about it.

You can't force a man to get an education. As regulations do provide for compulsory classes and educational level tests, meaning is probably: I don't know what education level my men have, or what classes or tests are required or are avail-



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able for them; but I suppose my T1&E NCO does and my first sergeant probably knows who the T1&E NCO is.

CAPT. ROSS A. SHELDON
T1&EO, TSB
Fort Benning, Ga.

The Mission of ARMY

• I can remember the days when I eagerly looked forward to the next issue of *Infantry Journal*. I was a private then, but that magazine had something for me that could save my life: articles on how to use the bayonet, throw the grenade, use a BAR more effectively were "must" material to me as I was about to go overseas with an infantry division.

I am sure that the *Field Artillery Journal*, likewise, had articles on how to perform RSOPs quicker and more effectively, how to lay a battery quicker, better FO procedure, and so on.

Now that these two fine magazines have merged, along with *Antiaircraft Journal*, something is missing. We no longer get the number of articles that pertain to our own branch that can be so helpful to younger officers eager to avoid mistakes or to do a better job, because of a well-written article in ARMY's predecessors.

Before you consider this a crank letter, let me emphasize that I don't intend to

be strictly critical. Many younger officers of my acquaintance are not members of AUSA because they feel ARMY has nothing to offer them. Again I send out the plea: more articles on the company and battalion level.

I am interested in an Army career, and since others might feel that my thinking is not on a level high enough for the Army's best interests, perhaps it would be better if this letter is unsigned.

More issues of the December 1954 caliber are all I ask. I sincerely hope they are on the way.

(NAME WITHHELD)

APO 34, NYC

• The officers and executive council of AUSA and the staff of ARMY recognize that this man's thinking represents a fairly sizeable minority of infantry and artillery officers. It is an attitude to be respected and has received consideration at all times. However the job of the AUSA and its magazine is to meet the challenges of the times as they arise. In the early 1940s the principal problem was to teach the youth of a nation that hadn't had a warlike thought in more than twenty years how to fight and how to operate the complicated equipment of all of the arms. The Infantry and Artillery journals did a thorough and helpful

job in those fields. As an example—and one that was universal to all arms and services—there was the critical problem of keeping motor vehicles in operating order. At that time the service journals devoted a great deal of space to "preventive maintenance" and how to "keep 'em rolling." This is still a problem, though no longer critical, and so you don't see articles on the subject these days. A further example is the articles this magazine published in 1950-51 when the terrible inadequacies of close-support aviation came to light in Korea. These examples demonstrate that it is the job of this magazine to react to the challenge of the times with timely and vigorous presentation of the best interests of the Army. Today the critical problems are national defense policy, the role of the Army, and its modernization. Therefore it is the duty of AUSA and ARMY to concentrate on them. This we are doing to the fullest possible extent. The absence from ARMY of the kind of material our critic mentions doesn't mean that he is deprived of it. Fortunately the service schools publish a great deal of this kind of helpful material and it is available at little or no cost. Any interested soldier can write the Department of Non-Resident Instruction of any of the branch schools and ask for a list of their publications.



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Did you ever notice that some of Nature's most amiable creatures are those most effectively equipped to deal sorrow to bullies? Now, we at REPUBLIC don't necessarily go all the way with the late Ernest Thompson Seton, who once said the much misunderstood skunk ought to be some sort of national symbol because of its peaceable disposition backed by formidable fire-power. But we do think history has shown that in human affairs, too, those who would live without fear must first earn respect.



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JULY 1956

THE ARMY'S MONTH

75,000 Ill-housed Army Families

Some 75,000 Army families in the U. S. are deprived of decent housing and Secretary of the Army Brucker is "exercised" about it, Under Secretary Charles C. Finucane told the House Armed Services Committee. These 75,000 families "either are separated, live too far from their stations, pay an exorbitant rent, live in substandard quarters or even a combination of these," Mr. Finucane testified. Two posts woefully lacking in decent housing, although not the only ones, are Fort Bragg, N. C., and Fort Benning, Ga. Fort Bragg has a deficit of more than 2,200 family units and 1,500 existing units at that post "fall into the sub-standard category." Fort Benning needs at least 1,000 units. The Army hopes to build 4,000 units with appropriated funds and another 22,897 under the Capehart housing program. At best this would leave some 50,000 Army families still without adequate housing.

New Combat Formations Under Test

Testing of the Army's new combat formations continues. At Fort Bragg the 82d Airborne Division put together a "Force A" battalion combat team (See article by General Wyman on page 39) consisting of the 3d Battalion, 505th Airborne Infantry, 505th Regimental Tank Co., and a platoon of the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion. Artillery fire support was by Battery C, 456th Airborne Field Artillery Battalion. After each element of the force had received intensive training in the mobile force concept, Force A joined together for pre-planned maneuvers of right and left flank envelopments, penetration, pursuit, delaying action and defense of strong points.

At Fort Campbell, the cadre (187th Airborne Infantry) of the soon-to-be-reactivated 101st Airborne Division formed up an airborne combat group

Neptune to test the organizational concepts of the new division. Beginning with squad and platoon exercises, Group Neptune will proceed during July to exercises involving the entire force. Neptune's commander is Major Sheldon L. Thompson.

Report on AWC Strategy Seminar

Some forty-seven civilian leaders (including the Business Manager of this magazine) attended a highly-stimulating three-day session at the National Strategy Seminar of the Army War

As is SOP to the Army, the 116th Engineer Group and the 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry, stationed at Fort Lewis, Wash., rushed to the scene when Bonners Ferry, Ida., was threatened by the flooded Kootenai River. Arriving two days before the peak, the troops built emergency levees that saved the town. At its crest the river rose to 37 feet which was a full 18 inches higher than the previous known record. For two weeks the soldiers helped Bonners Ferry men and boys keep the water back.



College at Carlisle Barracks. At the editor's urging his colleague produced this brief report on the experience:

"This three-day session with the 'military mind' left all of us non-military people at the seminar exhausted but stimulated. We heard Army leaders and government officials discuss the major problems bearing on our national security and then we broke up into joint student-guest committees to hammer out solutions. This is where we civilians got our eyes opened. The broad range of discussion and the atmosphere of full, frank and free academic inquiry made it a most provocative, intellectual exercise. Every civilian I talked to (and they were all men of recognized capability in their fields) spoke most respectfully of the range and interest of the military student group. I heard the chairman of the Board of Directors of one of America's greatest corporations say that he knew of no American group of similar age and experience that had as broad knowledge and keen interest in all phases of national life as the student body of the Army War College. It was an unforgettable experience."

Third Army Spruces Up Day Rooms

To improve the comfort and decor of Army day rooms, Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey of Third Army called upon three enlisted men who were interior decorators in civilian life to redecorate four day rooms at Fort Bragg. Men of the command then evaluated them on questionnaires. All of this is the beginning of a three-year program of redecorating all Third Army day rooms using non-appropriated funds.

Army Extension Courses Being Revamped

CONARC has announced the revising of the Army Extension Course Program to provide correspondence courses for all Army components that will par-

allel resident instruction in general service, specialist or branch service schools. Equivalent credit for residence courses will be given in such schools as Armor, Adjutant General, Chaplains, Ordnance and Transportation Schools, effective July 2. Other schools are adjusting their curriculum, wherever practicable, toward that objective. In some cases, short tours of active duty will be combined with correspondence courses to achieve this equivalency.

The old "series" course designations will be abandoned for names more descriptive of resident instruction—Pre-Commission, Company and Advance Extension Courses. Subject matter covered in the Staff Extension Course will parallel that given at Command and General Staff College and the Special Extension Courses will cover such fields as psychological warfare, and legal and hospital administration.

Effective July 2 all pre-commission courses, regardless of branch, will be administered by The Infantry School for Continental Army Command. Some 131,000 persons are now enrolled in the AEC program. Of these 34,000 are on active duty.

Deputy Appointed for Army R&D

Dr. Edward G. Witting, formerly Chief Scientist of the Army Signal Corps and head of the Physical Sciences Division of the Army Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, is now the Deputy Director (to William H. Martin) of Army Research and Development. A physicist, Dr. Witting served as a major in the Signal Corps during World War II. He received his PhD from Johns Hopkins University in 1935.

Army Aviation Moves Ahead

¶ Army representation at the annual meeting of the American Helicopter Society in Washington in May included the outgoing President of the AHS, Brig. Gen. William B. Bunker; Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, who accepted the Capt. William J. Kossler award given all of the military services for outstanding helicopter rescue work during the past year; Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, who spoke on "The Army's Stake in the Helicopter"; and Col. Robert R. Williams, who was elected treasurer of AHS.

¶ Brig. Gen. Carl I. Hutton, Commandant Army Aviation School, at the

The redesignation of the 1802d Special Regiment as the 1st Infantry Regimental Combat Team was observed at West Point on 15 May when Lt. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan, Superintendent of the Military Academy, presented the regimental colors to Col. Roy J. Herte, the regimental commander.



The first military nuclear power plant being built at Fort Belvoir by the Army Engineers and the Atomic Energy Commission. A model of the plant is in the foreground.





That these patched-up pistoleers are veteran competitors of rifle and pistol matches is attested by the patches of previous shooting matches they have participated in. This shot was made at the First Army Rifle and Pistol Championship matches at Fort Dix early in May.

Aviation Writers' Association convention in San Francisco:

"Army aviation today is based upon the premise that aircraft can and should

be included organically with Army formations. In this day, you do not need a superman in super organization for airplanes. . . . There are those in Army

aviation who insist that the Army must have an aviation branch. There certainly may be a requirement for personnel who devote their entire careers to aviation matters. In the longer view, however, just as we must argue that the Air Force has no divine right to a monopoly of flying machines just because they fly, it is also obvious that an aviation branch in the Army should have no monopoly on flying machines for any similar reason."


Vertol Aircraft Co. has an \$850,000 Army contract for design and development of a flying test bed, tilt-wing, turbine-powered vertical takeoff and landing aircraft.

Press report of statement by Stanley Hiller, Jr.: The Army has twice as many helicopters in terms of pounds of weight as the Navy and Air Force combined. The Army really controls the destiny of the helicopter industry.

Hall Hibbard, General Manager of the Lockheed Missile Systems Division, foresees the day when mail and high-priority freight will be delivered by missile. "If you want to send an iron lung to the Klondike, it will only take minutes" by missile, Mr. Hibbard said. (Remember Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg's "Logistical Muscles by Missile" in May ARMY?)

At the public demonstration at Fort Bliss of the firing of advanced Army weapons, Lt. Gen. Stanley R. Mickelsen, CG, ARAACOM; Maj. Gen. Robert J. Wood, CG, The AA & GM Center; Mr. Leonard K. Firestone, President, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., of Calif.; and Brig. Gen. Tom V. Stayton,

CG, 1st Guided Missile Group, pose in front of a Corporal guided missile. Below, a Nike scores a kill on a radio-controlled 11-foot Firebee jet drone moving at approximately 500 mph. Upon recovery, drone revealed damage by fragments and concussion caused by burst.



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Organized for Separateness

COLONEL LELAND B. KUHRE

ISN'T there something wrong somewhere when the American citizen is placed in the position of having to choose between the Army, or the Navy, or the Air Force? Or to choose the relative strength of each?

How can he do it intelligently? What information has he on which to base his choice? Newspapers, magazines, books and speeches? Can "leaked" papers and press releases and slanted articles and partisan speeches be the stuff of sound decision?

We rationalize the situation by calling it "competition"; and, of course, that can always be made to sound "healthy." But the public isn't in the mood to buy. The press is talking of single service and is asking for decisions from the President, the Secretary of Defense, and from Congress.

What is wrong? What is lacking? What decisions are necessary? Let us first see what is accepted as right, and then we may be able to let analogy suggest what is wrong.

IN the June issue of **ARMY**, in "The Single-Weapon Fallacy," Dr. Atkinson ends with General Eisenhower's statement in *Crusade in Europe*: "Our Mediterranean experience had reaffirmed the truth that unity, coordination, and cooperation are the keys to successful operations. War is waged in three elements but *there is no separate land, air or naval war*. Unless all assets are efficiently combined and coordinated against a properly selected, common objective, their maximum potential power cannot be realized." (italics supplied.) Let us examine the Mediterranean situation for a moment.

Who determined the balance of forces? General Eisenhower. Who assigned missions to the forces so that the summation of their efforts would accomplish the mission of the whole command? General Eisenhower. Who supplied the trained individuals, trained organizations, and matériel to the Mediterranean? The Army, Navy and Air in the Zone of the Interior produced the individuals, organizations and matériel in accordance with the estimated requirements

established by the Mediterranean force. But did the Army, Navy, or Air in the Zone of the Interior determine the relative proportion of each? No. Was the American public asked to decide on who used what weapon? No; the people knew that General Eisenhower had the whole mission, and that he was accountable for it. Since the whole responsibility had been placed on the Mediterranean force, only it could decide the proportion of land, sea, and air to be used and assign appropriate missions to each. The public depended upon General Eisenhower to combine and coordinate all assets against a "properly selected, common objective."

THE Unification Act was hammered out in an atmosphere of fighting for the separateness of the services; and the Act provided for this separateness by assigning roles and missions so as to make each service feel responsible for the defense of America—each in its medium of land, or water, or air. The cited policy followed in the Mediterranean was "no separate land, air, or naval war"; yet the Unification Act says there is such separateness.

The people, through Congress and the Unification Act, have established separateness and have made the three services feel directly responsible to the people for conducting three separate wars. What follows is a very natural and logical responsiveness to the people—that each of the three services presents its case directly to the people when it believes that its capabilities for defense are being weakened.

In the Mediterranean situation there was one force, and the whole force had the mission—not the separate elements within the force. It would follow, then, that the organizational structure for our national defense should be in parallel with the organizational structure for the Mediterranean if we are to apply the same fundamentals of unity, coordination and cooperation with all assets efficiently combined against the objective so as to realize their maximum potential power. To do this:

The missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force *Departments* would have to be changed to ones of being producers of trained individuals, trained organizations, and matériel peculiar for delivery to a U. S. Forces (to be created), and the U. S. Forces would have the *whole mission* of defense together with the *whole accountability* to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the people. The U. S. Forces would have to estimate the proportion of land, sea, and air effort for its global mission; and it would have within it, or on call, the proportion of land, sea, and air forces appropriate to the mission and the situation at any given time.


Then the Army, Navy and Air Force *Departments* would have to sell their respective capabilities to the U. S. Forces—not to the American public. And the U. S. Forces would be using sound information to make decisions commensurate with its responsibility as opposed to the American citizen using propaganda information to make decisions wholly incommensurate with his responsibility.

We have been steadily moving in the direction of a U. S. Forces with the establishing of joint commands under the doctrine of major interest. What basic change would be required in the present situation? Just the one remaining step from "joint" to "one"!

Colonel Leland B. Kuhre, Corps of Engineers, retired, makes his home in San Antonio, Texas. He has been an occasional contributor for many years.

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UNIFICATION

HOW MUCH AND WHAT KIND?

On the creation of the War Office, 1776

The Benefits derived from it, I flatter myself will be considerable tho' the plan upon which it is first formed may not be perfect. This like other great works in its first Edition, may not be entirely free from Error. Time will discover its Defects and experience suggest the Remedy, and such further Improvements as may be necessary; but it was right to give it a Beginning.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

EVERY time a little of the hot air of controversy escapes the Pentagon battlements, a rash of pronouncements insisting on more unification of our military establishment bubbles out of politicians, statesmen, retired officers and editorial writers. All declaim that the spectacle is shameful, fraught with danger, and the general situation abominable. The only solution, they declare, is complete unification: one uniform, one promotion list, one general staff, all under a single chief of staff responsible to a single Secretary of Defense and the Commander in Chief. The plain inference is that full unification will dispel discord and promote sweet harmony. Nothing could be more fallacious, as even the sketchiest reflection on the past will demonstrate.

Fred C. Ainsworth and Leonard Wood wore the same uniform. Yet they quarreled bitterly on the issue of military control. Billy Mitchell and Charles P. Summerville also wore identical uniforms. The only visible difference between the pre-World War II "battleship" and "carrier" admirals was the color of the shoes peeping out from under Navy blue pant legs. Plainly a single service does not eliminate basic controversies. Sometimes indeed, less centralization rather than more unification, eliminates frictions and promotes military efficiency. In the early years of this century the single

artillery arm of the Army was split into factions. And as both world wars were to demonstrate, the proper solution was adopted when the seacoast and field artilleries were separated. As a result field artillery developed the fine traditions of fire support of infantry and armor, and seacoast artillery was able, when the time came, to make the transition to the antiaircraft mission.

There are persuasive indicators (as we demonstrated last month in "The Promise of Ballistic Missiles") that a greater degree of unification may be imperative in this age of rapid advancement in technology. But the notion that more unification will dispel controversy has no validity. Indeed less unification might be better if non-controversy is the sole goal. And just as fallacious is the notion that unification is necessary because it "saves" money.

IT is impossible to produce any evidence that unification has been kinder to the taxpayer. Never in our history has the nation had to support a sizeable military establishment through a decade of cold war and so not even Univac could come up with firm conclusions as to relative fiscal performance. The matter is moot though surface indications are that unification may have been slightly more costly (which doesn't mean it has been a

failure, for there are benefits that have to be considered too).

While on fiscal matters it must be said that the explanation that all Pentagon controversies are rooted in money (appropriations) is so superficial as to be misleading. Military appropriations are vital only because of what they buy: weapons systems and trained manpower. Strategic decisions dictate the weapons systems

The debate over unification through the years since 1945 rests upon the assumption that the three services are divided according to the element in which they perform: land, sea and air. Certain commonsense (usually) compromises have had to be made to keep this concept in workable shape, but the accepted assumptions are that the role of sea power is the command of the seas, the role of air power the command of the air, and the



Unprecedented Press Conference on 21 May 1956 by The Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries and the chiefs of staff.

From left to right: Air Chief Twining, Air Secretary Quarles, Army Chief Taylor, Army Under Secretary Finucane (Mr. Brucker was out of town), Secretary of Defense Wilson, JCS Chairman Radford, Navy Secretary Thomas, Navy Chief Burke, Marine Commandant Pate.

and manpower requirements and so it is strategy (meaning national security and survival) that is at the bottom of inter-service controversies. No more false picture of the origins of the recent controversy could be painted than one that used the dollar sign as a motif.

THE true objective of unification is neither the elimination of controversy nor the reduction of defense expenditures through economies (desirable though both may be), but the development of the best possible military system for national defense and the advancement of those national objectives that are adopted by the people through Congress and the Chief Executive. If complete unification will make the military establishment better able to perform these missions, let's have it forthwith. If a somewhat lesser degree of unification (or none at all) would better serve the purpose, let's have it. This may seem rudimentary and unnecessary to repeat, but since, as we have seen, most considerations of unification evolve out of inter-service controversy, it seems necessary to state the situation in such a way as to lead to a consideration of the fundamental issues in unification.

role of army power, *not, let it be noted*, command of the ground, but sustained operations on land aimed at destroying the enemy's armed forces and his will to resist. In effect this is "command of the land" to be sure, but Army doctrine has never been expressed in that way. Perhaps it should be.

A brilliant and far-sighted analysis of organizational theories and concepts are contained in an unpublished study, "Unification of the Armed Forces," which Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Lawrence J. Legere, Jr., Infantry, made in 1949-50 in pursuit of a Ph.D. at Harvard University. The remainder of this Staff Report is entirely quoted from Colonel Legere's analysis.

Theories of Organization

THE elemental theory of armed services organization essentially holds that the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force should be organized, equipped, and trained for the exercise of special skills demonstrated on the ground, on or under the water, and in the air, respectively. Increasingly popular Air Force jargon tends to reduce the "elements" to two: air and "surface." This is a theory based on weapons—air weapons, ground

weapons, water weapons—and if carried to its logical extreme also results in absurdities. For example, air and ship bases would have to be manned by Army personnel; only when the airplanes were in the air and the ships on the sea could Air Force and Navy personnel, respectively, take charge. . . . [But] the proponents of the elemental approach do not wish to carry their analysis to such a ridiculous extreme; they only maintain that the *primary* criterion for organization should be the element in which the weapons of a given service are used.

Even as a primary criterion, however, the trielemental theory can lead to some strange thinking. Consider these remarks that General Doolittle made before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in late 1945:

I think that we should classify our weapons according to the medium in which they travel. For example, foot soldiers and tanks are definitely ground weapons. Battleships and carriers are sea weapons. Airplanes are, obviously, air weapons.

We can, I think, get a little confused about what an air weapon is. The airplane, of course, is definitely an air weapon. Suppose we take the buzz bomb, which has wings and an engine and everything except a pilot. Is that an air weapon? Possibly you could have a controversy there—possibly.

The V-2 had no wings. Is that an air weapon? I think it is.

Suppose we consider the rockets, even the bazooka. Is that last one an air weapon? If it is an air weapon, how about the cannon projectile traveling through the air? It uses air to get to the target. Is that an air weapon?

* * *

The thing is terribly complicated. However, I think we can simplify it by simply saying that any weapon, any directed weapon that uses air as a medium of travel is an air weapon, whether an airplane with a pilot or an airplane without a pilot; whether it has wings, complete wings, rudimentary wings or whether the wings are entirely absent. If it is directed after it starts off and it uses air as a medium for travel, it is, then, an air weapon, the way I look at it.

Besides illustrating what can happen when a weapons-triemental approach to organization is unloosed, the quoted remarks of General Doolittle illustrate Air Force concern over future developments. The best case that can be established for Air Force domination of the guided missiles field is a case solidly based on the weapons-triemental theory. For thirty years the heart of the Air Force has been its pilots, men selected primarily for their possession of those physical and mental characteristics that make a good flier. During the same thirty years, from Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell to 1950, the first concern of the Air Force has been to create a strategic air weapon capable of striking the cities, factories, and homes of an enemy. Standing at the beginning of an era in which such strategic attack will be delivered by pilotless guided missiles, the Air Force is understandably anxious to create a strong case for its retaining exclusive or primary responsibility for strategic air warfare. . . .

WHEN guided missiles are doing the strategic bombing in a future war the Air Force cry that only fliers understand fliers will lose much of its appeal. Destroying an enemy's supply sources differs not in kind, but only in degree, from destroying his supply lines or, for that matter, his armed soldiery. The psychology of flying and of fliers has provided a fair argument for separation of aviation from the Army, but when everyone is on the ground (except perhaps the pilots of airplanes supporting ground troops) the elemental theory must be a *weapons*-triemental theory, or it may turn around and bite its sponsors.

This sidelight discussion of guided missiles in the future suggests that the waging of a war is itself an enormous task, of which the purpose is to impose our will on the enemy. Because of this purposive nature of a war at the topmost level of national effort, many have supposed that the next lower level should logically be a process level, and have seized upon the ready-made division into land, sea, and air. This is the rationale behind the weapons-triemental theory. It continues by supposing that a land-bound Army, a sea-bound Navy, and an air-bound Air Force will each furnish contingents of elemental specialists for constitution into combat task forces on the level below that on which the division into elemental specialists takes place. This sort of thinking is sound enough as far as it goes, and is a fair theoretical explanation of how and why joint task forces and unified theater commands are created.

But not all action in a war is joint action. The war-making purpose of a nation in arms is too enormously comprehensive to permit a breakdown at the Departmental level into process organizations. The elements of land, water, and air do have an application here, for the purpose of each service is to dominate or command the element in or on which it primarily operates. To achieve command of its element a given service may require instruments or individuals that are especially developed or trained for operations in another element—for example, command of the sea requires airplanes; command of the air requires landing fields; and command of the land requires airplanes also.

* * *

WHAT this all leads to is the assertion that the Army, Navy and Air Force are purpose-type organizations whose respective war missions are to gain and exploit command of the land, sea and air against the enemy. They are not primarily providers of walkers, sailors, and fliers, or of tanks, ships and airplanes. This purposive theory can be carried so far as to claim the right of complete self-sufficiency for each service, a claim that would be patently absurd. A proper solution must be a compromise between the weapons-triemental and the

purposive approaches but should be weighted toward the latter.

A primarily purposive approach to national security organization will result in some duplication, which must be carefully planned and watched so that the increased effectiveness gained through some duplication of instruments among the services is not outweighed by placing too great a strain on national resources. All duplication or overlap is not evil, however; for example, there is reasonably general agreement that in research on and development of new weapons and techniques it is positively good.

Because the Army engages in land operations it is not excessive duplication for the Navy to maintain a Marine establishment adequate to the task of seizing and holding naval bases, unless or until larger land units are required. Although the Air Force engages in long-range air operations difficult to relate immediately to ground and sea actions, there is excellent reason for assigning to the Army control over the ground-support aircraft so important in the exercise of modern land power.

The alternative to permitting and even encouraging some duplication of instruments in the interest of effective land power, sea power and air power is to rely on the weapons-tri-elemental approach to a degree that leads virtually to mutual cooperation all over again. If the Army is satisfied with begging a co-equal service every time ground troops need air support, it is indeed indicative of fine fraternal spirit, but it is also an example of the same type of mutual cooperation the shortcomings of which provided the strongest argument in favor of unification.

UNIFICATION should not mean that a given service must always borrow or beg heavily in order to discharge its responsibility for command of the element in which it primarily operates. Naturally, as long as each service is not self-sufficient it will be necessary to attract units from another service for particular enterprises; an example of this was the use of B-17 long-range bombers to assist the ground effort at St. Lô in late July, 1944.* It is also true that at the theater of operations level there must at all times be unified command under a single individual served by a joint staff; the duty of this commander and his staff is to gain and exploit most effectively command of the land, sea and air in the theater by closely coordinating the operations of the three services. Even the Navy Department during and after World War II supported this concept of unified

theater commands; where the Navy parted company with Army-Air Force unification zealots was over the question of what unification meant at two other levels: (1) the level next below the theater—i.e., the level of the individual services in the theater; (2) the level above the theater—i.e., the highest joint level in Washington.

. . . Each service should be organized primarily on the basis of *purpose*, that purpose being command of its elements. If this results, for example, in all three services owning some flying machines and antiaircraft units, it does not necessarily run counter to the spirit of unification. If, on the other hand, one service in a combat theater has to rely exclusively on the voluntary cooperation of another service in order to carry out its mission of commanding its element, the result does run counter to the spirit of unification. Such is the situation in current procedures for air support of ground action. The remedy today does not lie in heartier cooperation any more than it did before 1947, when the Air Force and the Army were decrying mutual cooperation as a method of conducting joint action. The remedy lies in making ground-support types of aircraft units organic within the Army, even if those aircraft do happen to move through the air.

THE question of what unification means or should mean at the highest joint level in Washington is one that has generated considerable heat since 1947, as the B-36 Congressional hearing of 1949 brought out. Some of the more important facts bearing on the problem are as follows:

- ¶ If the country could afford it, the best approach to the national defense problem might be to permit each service to organize and equip itself, *carte blanche*, for all contingencies.
- ¶ The country cannot afford such a course, even if it were advisable, and it is therefore necessary for the armed forces to accept something less than total preparation for all kinds of war.
- ¶ The method employed to try to secure the best return from the defense dollar has been to settle on a *strategic concept*, thereafter to assign specific responsibilities to each service, and finally to request the appropriations necessary for each service to fulfill its assigned responsibilities.
- ¶ There are sure to be honest differences arising in the course of this military planning and budget process.
- ¶ These differences require resolution if compromise does not satisfy all three services or if it is not in the best interest of national defense to compromise.
- ¶ No person has enough background in the techniques of land power, sea power, and air power to feel real confidence in making decisions that affect all three services.

*But when units of one service do work with units of another service, the enterprise must be carried on under the principle of *unity of command*; if it is not, unification has failed to accomplish its most important single objective. In air support of ground troops, current doctrine permits the air units to *cooperate* with ground commanders.

LOGISTICS HAS MANY FACES

A FEW days before that December morning when gray-clad Germans broke through the fog hanging low in the Ardennes, S. L. A. Marshall stopped near Utah Beach to talk to a sentry walking post around a supply dump. The sentry said that both he and the dump had been there since three weeks after the invasion and that it had been a long time since anything had been removed from the dump. That was one aspect of logistics in World War II.

Another was the payoff of the doctrine that the "impetus of supply is from the rear"—so tremendous was the outpouring of the arsenal of democracy that no soldier, in theory, had ever to do without either chocolate bar or ammunition. That some soldiers did do without revealed a hidden gimmick in the concept: a pipeline can be stuffed to the point of constipation by the massive forced feeding of a wealthy and talented nation.

That the gimmick hadn't been foreseen isn't surprising; no other country had ever lavished such a largess of goods on armies sent so far from home. Now we know that that very lavishness contained the germs of defeat and our logisticians are searching for an antidote. Colonel Hauschultz, in the article beginning on the facing page, ably diagnoses the problems and suggests the direction the science of logistics must take. In the article following it, Joseph Bourdow reports on a step the Army is taking right now: the inauguration of a limited experiment that reverses the concept and makes the impetus of supply come from the front.





The Search for New Logistical Concepts

COLONEL EARL H. HAUSCHULTZ

MUCH more attention is being given to developing revolutionary changes in our tactical concepts than in the equally important field of logistics. Our nation's security in the Atomic Age requires us to develop logistical concepts that are workable and in harmony with tactical changes. In this article I shall examine briefly the nature of the logistical problem in modern war and define a concept for meeting the nuclear challenge.

As we proceed, it would be wise to remember that although planning for war may be a science, its conduct is an art and as such is subject to the imponderables found in the variables which characterize military operations.

The foremost of these variables is that wars are waged by fallible human beings. Here we deal with the unpredictable and many-sided reactions of superiors, equals and subordinates. Out of human frailties and foibles come misunderstanding, misinterpretation, selfishness, contrariness and incompetence—all failings that can disconcert the best-laid plans.

In our search for the truth in the struggle for survival, the areas of richest promise lie in ourselves and the courage of our own convictions. The Bible says it clearly: *The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be, and that which is done is that which shall*

be done; and there is no new thing under the sun.

Historical Evolution of Logistics

It is significant that recognition of logistics, as a third major subdivision (after strategy and tactics) of the science of war, has been relatively tardy. Although Alexander understood its principles and Napoleon learned at Moscow that armies march on their stomachs, logistics was only faintly understood by history's great commanders. Lincoln had a profound understanding of logistical implications. In a letter to General Banks he demonstrated that the Union armies moved more slowly than the Confederates because every U. S. commander insisted on gathering huge supplies before he advanced, then had to get horses and wagons to haul the supplies, then had to get forage for the horses, and then had to get extra-duty men to care for the animals and the supplies. "My Dear General," wrote Lincoln, "this expanding and piling up of impedi-

*"Experience is not enough;
you have to have some vision"*

mentia [sic] has been so far almost our ruin, and will be our final ruin if it is not abandoned."

There are several reasons for the laggardness in perfecting logistical organization for war. Before the complexities of modern equipment were made available by the Industrial Revolution, the ageless practice of living off the land made extensive logistical support unnecessary. On the April night in 1775, when Paul Revere rode the few miles from Charlestown to Lexington with the news that the British were coming, he set in motion forces which made history. Within the next twenty-four hours these forces produced three results: the militia was mobilized, it was equipped, and it met the enemy.

Six generations after the ride of Paul Revere, the U. S. declaration of war against Germany released the same forces, but in 1917 the process was in exaggerated slow motion. Three and a half months elapsed before the first number was drawn in a draft which was to provide an army of nearly four million men. Another one and a half months elapsed before the first group of selectees started for the training camps. The United States had been at war with Germany nearly seven months before the first shot was fired by American troops on the Western Front, and at the close of 1917 there was but a single American division in action.

It was in this war that the high command found a need for an official service and supply organization.

The period between the two world wars set the stage for conventional modern warfare by advances in technology, production and distribution. It was not, however, until the final stages of the war that the full significance of the impact of total war on logistics was generally realized and its various components assembled.

Today, the relatively small armies of the past have given place to intricate combinations of men and machines. They feature mobility, fire power and

destructive capabilities undreamed of a century ago. They create tremendous demands for supplies and equipment of unimaginable variety.

OUT of this situation several problems developed: how to maintain production through dispersal of plant and supporting populations; how to provide shelter, food, clothing and utilities for disaster relief with the attendant drain on reserve stocks intended for the combat forces; how to protect extended lines of communications from interruption.

During World War II the foundation for theater logistics rested on preliminary plans and decisions made in Washington. Though for months before our entrance into the war we had planned for the movement of troops overseas, these plans failed to estimate correctly shipping requirements in terms of existing capability. Throughout the war operations were continually delayed by shipping shortages.

The war in Europe was characterized by mammoth stocks of supplies, equipment and matériel which could not keep up with the tactical pace over comparatively short distances. The war in the Pacific was typified by austerity—though inspired planning and leadership managed to support the combat forces over tremendous stretches of water and jungle.

An examination of these two theaters should provide some fundamental guide lines for the future.

THE landing on the continent of Europe and the consequent defeat of the German armies was an unparalleled movement of men and supplies in which it was conclusively proved that commanders could not ignore supply problems nor disregard their effect upon operations.

Overlord was backed by logistical support based upon a build-up in the United Kingdom. There were, however, three vital factors Overlord planners failed to consider which af-



fected not only the logistics but the over-all strategy of the campaign. The first of these was the tendency of senior combat commanders to override supply considerations and indulge in spectacular, if short-lived, tactical gains. This is illustrated by the dash of the Third Army across France despite the absence of ports to supply it. The dash bogged down, not because of enemy action but because of the supply shortage which the possession of the ports would have insured.

The second factor was overestimating the capabilities of the French railways. With great ingenuity—and publicity—truck transportation was thrown into the breach, and while the Red Ball Express did provide a temporary stopgap, it did so at the expense of the long-term problem of forward build-up.

The third factor was logistical organization. During the first phase of the campaign the ComZ commander also served as the deputy theater commander. This created a condition whereby tactical planning was influenced by an unrealistic logistics plan. It created an inflexible situation and finally an inability to support the unanticipated speed of the pursuit across Europe.

Logistics experience in ETO can be summarized as follows:

- ¶ A tendency to complicate command relationships by excessive decentralization of operations and authority.
- ¶ Inadequate delineation and control

Colonel Earl H. Hauschultz was commissioned in the Infantry Reserve after graduating from Ripon College in 1933. After a tour with the CCC and employment as a mechanical engineer he was ordered to active duty in 1941, serving five years in the Southwest and Western Pacific Theaters. Integrated into the Regular Army in 1953, he transferred to the Transportation Corps. He has served at the Seattle Port of Embarkation, The Transportation School, and on the staff of IX Corps in Korea. A graduate of the Army War College, he is now G3 Executive for Plans and Doctrine at CONARC.

From Noemfoor in the far off Pacific to Europe's Schnee Eifel prodigious quantities of American resources were consumed by guns, engines and men. Inevitably more than a little was wasted.



of the relationship between the combat forces and the ComZ and its sections.

¶ A transportation system inadequate to the needs of the combat forces.

¶ Inadequate control of transportation and the flow of supplies from ComZ to the combat zone.

¶ An inadequate communications system unable to control supply operations.

¶ Failure to plan for and provide adequate, feasible and workable supply levels.


¶ Failure to implement sound principles of stock control.

To a lesser degree these same lessons could be derived from a study of the Southwest Pacific Theater. Here, however, maneuver was on a grand scale, and a study of the distances involved and theater deployment could well be used as the pattern for logistical support under dispersed conditions.

Effect of Nuclear Weapons on the Science of War

The maturing of air capability and mass-destruction weapons has established a requirement for new tactical concepts. Such tactics, according to tacticians, will emphasize the principles of maneuver and surprise. To exploit these two principles, modern tactics envisages deployment in great depth and across broad fronts with the capability of concentrating great striking power rapidly. Where in the past this striking power has been made possible by concentrations of troops, fire





The Joint Logistics Operations Center works under the staff supervision of the G4. The elements are directly representative of the pertinent technical service. This organization would appear at the ComZ and subordinate levels. Its World War II precedent in the SWPA was the Cargo Loading Committee.

power is rapidly achieving dominance, and further advances in automatic weapons of greater power will emphasize this even more.

This establishes the need for small, combat-autonomous, mobile battle groups, trained and equipped for fast attack and quick withdrawal; means of forcing the enemy into concentrations that are rewarding to nuclear weapons; the ability to hold strong points for prolonged periods, with supply and reinforcement by air; an integrated, coordinated and effective system of tactical air, or guided-missile, and ground attack; extensive preparations for retarding and denying operations; and, finally, tremendous fire power.

THESE changing concepts have a definite impact on logistics. They have caused many logisticians to anticipate great increases in the support organization along with the acceptance of added responsibility. If we are to avoid

commitment of too large a fraction of our army to supply functions, improvements must be made in the efficiency of logistical support organization and procedures.

Nuclear weapons clearly leave both strategic and tactical logistics in a vulnerable position. It is no longer true that the impetus of supply from the rear stops short of artillery range at the army supply point. Logistical operations can no longer be conducted with relative safety behind this point.

Current Logistical Problem Areas

The present logistics system operates on the principle of mass by concentrating huge quantities of supplies and matériel contiguous to the combat operations area in static and usually partially unidentified storage. This system will not do in a time of nuclear challenge. It has hindered logistical mobility in the past, and will certainly

prove inadequate for the support of modern mobile tactical concepts. The application of modern mobility to strategy and tactics dictates its application to logistics. An academic treatment of the problem suggests several means for making the logistics system flexible. This requires an examination of the present system in the light of technological capabilities.

Any study of logistics must encompass its basic functions: movement and supply. Supply can further be reduced to the functions of procurement, storage and distribution. Our interest lies in the business of getting the means for making war from the ZI stockpile to the combat troops.

It has been demonstrated that in spite of speed capabilities ten to a hundred times greater than those enjoyed by George Washington, the average speed forward for supplies in World War II exceeded Washington's by only two miles an hour, *for a record three and a half miles an hour.*

This emasculation of transportation capability can be charged mainly to outmoded administrative and handling procedures. To gear logistics to the pace of modern war requires the elimination of administrative and procedural stoppages in the pipeline, and a built-in capability to identify tonnage in terms of line items concurrently with that movement.

A supply system that embraces a complex depot system and emphasizes detailed inventories with attendant segregation of items on a retail basis, plus a requisitioning system reminiscent of a housewife's shopping calendar, is incapable of meeting the requirements of the future. Hindsight convinces the thoughtful that this system has worked successfully in the past only because of an almost inexhaustible wealth in resources. This system has provided adequate front-line supply at the expense of mountainous stockpiles of supplies stretching from the rear of the field army back to the manufacturing plants in the Zone of the Interior, and the farther the distances involved, the more the cavernous maw of the pipeline craved. A large portion of these supplies never see the front lines, being required to support the force that is needed to count and handle them. This creates a vicious cycle: the more supplies, the larger the force required to administer them, which in turn cre-

ates the requirement for still more supplies, and so on.

An example of what we must achieve can be found in the logistical problem of skyscraper construction in New York City. Space for stockpiling construction materials simply doesn't exist; yet the cost of labor requires that materials be on the job site when the workmen are ready for them. The solution is a carefully controlled delivery system that brings what is needed to the job when it is needed.

The logistical requirements of war are massive in comparison with the building of the largest skyscraper. And yet the Army must do as well. The secret lies in our organization for logistical support. That means qualified professional officers.

Our organization for logistical support has grown more by happenstance than by considered design. Generally, even a poor organization is not fatal if capable men direct it. However, the logistical organization, comprised as it is of seven separate segments, lends itself to weakness through piecemeal and unconcerted effort. This has required the superimposition of a staff at the departmental level in both world wars. Our present Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics may be the answer.

In the final analysis, the fact that our logistical mobility is little better to-

day than that of our Revolutionary ancestors is due mostly to the lack of professional officers who appreciate the problem and have the know-how to solve it. To develop men with such understanding and know-how, we should:

¶ Develop a uniform logistical doctrine that will apply to all the technical services. A single agency must do this, since the development of logistical doctrine cannot be divorced from the development of tactical doctrine.

¶ Effectively coordinate the technical services, particularly in the area of logistical operations.

¶ Create a logistics developments group commensurate to the combat developments function of Continental Army Command.

¶ Provide for professional logisticians by establishing a logistician's career pattern to include schooling above branch level for combat and service officers interested in such a career.

Can Logistics Meet the Challenge?

Armed with these elements, what can logistics do with its present capabilities?

As we have seen, logistics has trailed behind tactics in mobility, maneuverability, dispersion, and deception. Therefore, the problem that faces logisticians is not so much to embark on

COMPARATIVE ORDER AND SHIPPING TIME (surface transportation only)

WORLD WAR II

(Experience figures extracted from
FM 101-10, August 1949)

Action	Time
Preparation of requisition in theater	12 days
Airmail time to POE	4
OSD edit and extract time	8
Mail time to ZI depot	2
Depot shipping time	14
Transit time to POE	12
POE loading time	12
Transit time to POD	20
POD unloading time	12
Transit time to army	24 ^a
Total	120 days

^aTime accumulation includes message from theater
^bBased on 1,500-mile average distance

TODAY

(Time estimates by experienced movements control officers using modern facilities capabilities)

Action	Time
Daily theater shortage reports	1 day
Radio telecon	—
Monitor only	1
Radio telecon	1 ^c
	2
	6 ^d
	2
	15 ^e
	2
	2 ^f
Total	32 days

^cNew MSTS freighters have 22-knot capability
^dAdd 10 days for time to division
^eBased on 500-mile average

revolutionary changes as it is to catch up with evolution.

The Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II suggests a solution to the dispersion problem. Who can deny that if the scattered bases dispersed along the axis of advance had within themselves been sufficiently dispersed, this would set the doctrinal pattern for a war in the atomic age? The history of this theater indicates that while the strategist and tactician exploited movement for their purpose, the logistician, perhaps through mistaken economic reasoning, allowed the means of movement to exploit him. There were exceptions when, in tactical emergencies, supplies bypassed the chain of bases to flow directly to the consumer. These instances, while rare, show that it is possible for supply and movement to react as one sensitive, intelligent body to the requirements of combat.

SINCE speed of movement is constantly increasing, it is logical to focus effort on a system employing both movement and dispersion, letting movement compensate, so far as possible, for added manpower and materials required in a system built around dispersion alone.

If logistical mobility is to enable us to evade the fury of the unleashed atom, we must identify what we can do with what we have and then determine the effectiveness of the result. By applying such procedures as automatic supply coupled with daily theater shortage reports, radio telecon, faster loading and unloading of ships, improved materials handling, and such, it is possible to reduce the World War II average order and shipping time of 120 days to 32 days. Roughly this means that the speed of movement forward has quadrupled. Even with this modest improvement, theater reserve supply levels could be reduced by a minimum of two thirds without jeopardizing combat support.

Logistics' New Look

Reducing theater supply levels will improve the dispersion capability while concurrently reducing manpower and facilities requirements, which will in turn release movement capability for the additional load created by dispersion. This argument should make it clear that movement and dispersion complement each other.

From these evolutionary trends



Computers like this big IBM Electronic Data Processing Machine will help keep MASS going at full speed

ONE RESULT OF THE SEARCH

The Impetus Is from the Front

emerges the shadowy shape of modern logistics. These trends emphasize an expedited transportation system, which to be fully efficient must revolve about an expedited materials-handling system. Administration of supply and movement can be drastically reduced through greater use of modern communications facilities using semiautomatic supply methods. This, in turn, can eliminate repetitive screenings of requisitions at various command echelons, some of which can be entirely eliminated from the logistics system. Drastic reduction of theater levels of supply will eliminate manpower and facilities requirements. Modern movement, materials handling, and communications technology now enable the logistician to employ dispersion and movement as his answer to the nuclear challenge.

The line of communications from source to destination gives us the room to maneuver. In the sense of cross-country mobility, the width of the LOC must be defined as the width of the operational theater.

As segments of this LOC will suffer dislocation from time to time by enemy action, the entire system must move forward at a rate geared to consumption requirements. When a segment is destroyed, the loss, while comparatively small due to its dispersed state, must be replaced from the supplies in "fluid dispersion" and this stock replaced in turn by an increase in speed in all seg-

ments to the rear of the one destroyed until the gap is closed. Obviously, the major portion of the theater reserves are in the pipeline itself.

THE organizational structure required to man and control this system must provide integration or infinite coordination of supply and movement. It must provide security in fact instead of in theory. And lastly, in its philosophy, it must be unified within itself and be part and parcel of the combat forces which it supports.

Integration of supply and movement in the current organization can be attained by the introduction of a joint logistics operations center at ComZ and its various subordinate levels. This provides for the integration of the army technical services and the supporting sea and air elements. Stock status and movement control must be exercised around the clock.

It is time to cease conjecturing and time to do! We overcomplicate the science of logistics which, of the sciences of war, is the most factual and manageable if we would make it so.

My concluding thought is best expressed by a quotation from an address to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces made in 1946 by General Somervell: "The important thing is to let the plan be for the next war and not for the one just past. Experience is not enough; you have to have some vision."



Modern Army Supply System

JOSEPH A. BOURDOW

THE logistical nightmares evoked by even casual meditation on future prospects have been reviving the dormant ulcers of many elderly logisticians, veterans of 1942-45 and Korea. They are convinced, and rightly, that the kind of combat forces and tactical concepts being talked about today could not possibly be supported effectively by the system in use a decade or less ago. They will be happy to learn that this view is firmly shared by the Army's top command, and that extensive efforts are under way to create a logistical system that can support the mobile, flexible field Army that is coming.

A significant move in this direction begins on 1 July, when Seventh Army, without interrupting its normal activities, will become a giant guinea pig. Project MASS (for Modern Army Supply System) will begin a test operation in that command.

What's modern about the proposed new system? Practically everything. There are some machines that existed only on drawing boards a few years

ago. These wondrous contraptions—computers, transceivers, and the like—are key elements of MASS. But they are not the whole show; nor will they merely be superimposed on the present supply system in an effort to pump new life into the tired old carcass. The best of machines become boxes of costly junk if they aren't fed a steady diet of computable and processable data.

Of course the acid test of any supply system is a very simple one: Can it deliver needed supplies on time to the using units? That requirement will never change. If MASS proves able to perform this miracle with a reasonably high batting average, every unit commander and supply officer in the Army will be leading the cheers.

Equipment and techniques like those to be tested in Project MASS have been in use by various Army agencies for some time. The Adjutant General Corps and the Ordnance Corps, for example, are doing considerable administrative and supply work by means of the electronic gadgets that MASS will use.

Project MASS will concern itself only with repair parts. Seventh Army will continue to use its regular supply system for all other supplies. As a safety factor, in case MASS fails to perform as expected, the current repair parts system will be kept intact ready to resume operations immediately.

MOST descriptions of supply systems start where supplies originate—the Zone of the Interior. This fits the familiar old principle that the impetus of supply is from the rear toward the front. MASS reverses this concept, placing the impetus not where supplies originate but rather where they are needed and finally used. The working objective of past supply systems has been to keep the pipelines full, so that enough will trickle out the spigots at the other end. Future emphasis will be less upon pipeline volume and more upon rapid movement of selective stocks from supplier to user.

From Front to Rear

Thus it is at the using end that one logically begins the story of how MASS will operate. From the user, it flows rearward along the supply chain and then forward again to the starting point. The cycle can best be grasped by looking at the rearward and forward phases as two separate entities.

About half the time consumed in

supply operations has long consisted of "paper-line," the manifold actions which include the consolidation, extraction, and review of requisitions on their way to points of supply. When many echelons lie between user and supplier, paper-line can become a major crippler of an otherwise workable system. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of MASS is the promise it offers that huge chunks of paper-line may be lopped off the over-all supply cycle. The solution to excessive paper-line in the past has been to amass great stockpiles overseas, nearer the users. This has become militarily unsound; massed stockpiles in the theaters would be prized and vulnerable targets in the atomic age, while a policy of maintaining them also reduces our strategic flexibility.

MASS will attack the paper-line problem by providing greatly simplified requisition forms, by eliminating most of the consolidation and review procedures, and by speeding up the transmission of requisitions to supply points. Let's follow a typical MASS requisition from front to rear and see how these three features cut time and paper work to a minimum.

IN a Seventh Army unit (say, a line element of a division), a supply non-com, using the new stock-control form, executes a single-line item requisition for a repair part. The requisition is hand-carried to the direct-support unit. If the item is one authorized under MASS for selected stockage by that direct-support unit, our story ends right here. In order to traverse the entire cycle, we'll make it an item that is available only from a CONUS technical service stock control point.

At the direct-support unit, the requisition is transferred to a punch card. Accuracy of preparation by the requesting and direct-support unit is essential, because from this point on there will be no further review.

The direct-support unit transmits the request electrically (by transceiver linked to the machine that digests the punch card) as part of its daily supply message to the army supply control point.

At army, all the daily requests are screened (again electronically) against army-level selected stockage lists authorized under MASS. Since our sample item is not on this list, the requisition for it goes into a special handling category, which continues until delivery of

Joseph A. Bourdow, a civilian employee of the Department of the Army, has been an occasional contributor for many years.

the item to the using unit.

The requisition becomes part of Seventh Army's daily supply message by transceiver to the Oversea Supply Agency in Brooklyn, which will serve as CONUS National Control Center for Project MASS. Here, one of two procedures is followed. If the item is a non-stocked one, a request goes by transceiver to the appropriate technical service stock control point. The message also includes instructions for air shipment. If it is a stocked item, the technical service stock control point, using date processing machines, determines its availability in the supply system and if available transmits the shipment order to the appropriate depot.

From Supplier to Consumer

This completes the first half of the cycle. In less than two days, the requesting unit's demand has reached the

people who can fill it. And if the item had been on the selected stockage list of Seventh Army, the paper-line phase would have been completed in less than one day.

Now we have turned the corner and are ready to follow the item back to the requesting unit. Will it travel by sea or by air? That has already been determined by Seventh Army; one of the little holes in the punch card has passed the information along, so that the shipper knows which one of three priorities to assign: (1) Needed right now—ship by fastest means; (2) surface express, with domestic airlift authorized to meet port schedules; and (3) routine surface shipment.

When the item reaches Seventh Army its movement to final destination is handled by a courier system comparable to U. S. parcel post. If MASS performs as expected, Seventh Army will receive the item in no more, and


probably less, than ten days after the requesting unit hand-carries the initial requisition to its direct-support unit. Delivery time between army depot and requesting unit will naturally depend on the distance involved and other normal factors. Project MASS will try to arrive at some standards for this final step of the cycle.

The ten-day maximum applies only to items in the needed-now category, which are shipped by air. Items for replenishing Seventh Army depot stocks will go by express or routine surface transportation in a request-to-delivery cycle of twenty days or less.

What Else Besides Speed?

Although the example just given follows an item around the circuit, it does not cover several other important features of the new supply system. To appreciate these we must think in terms

Faster Logistical Support for Seventh Army



of not one requisition but of the several thousand which the many direct-support units send to Seventh Army on an average day. Then the role of the magic machines begins to show more plainly. At each step from Seventh Army, to CONUS National Control Center, to technical service control point or depot, the computers and transceivers produce and transmit a steady traffic in statistics, general and specific inventories, bin locations, and all the other kinds of supply information essential for controlling the system in its total operations.

Speed is the long suit of these machines, of course, but their usefulness is measured in other terms besides muzzle velocity. Human brains and hands could produce the same answers, if enough of them were given enough time. The machines spit out the answers with contemptuous ease—plus handsome bonuses in the form of manpower savings, money savings, and greater effectiveness of the army they serve.

During Project MASS the machines, besides cranking out supply messages and compiling data relating to operations, will also be psychoanalyzing the new supply system of which they are part. Through this self-analysis on the job, reports on the progress of the test will be flowing to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and the technical services. When the test is over, other machines will undoubtedly go on studying the assembled data in search of final truths that may eventually be used in solving broader logistical problems. For if MASS can keep Seventh Army in repair parts, there seems no reason to doubt that it could handle the whole supply job, though not necessarily in the same time limits, or using the same procedures. Moreover the system, once any kinks are ironed out, need not be confined to serving one field army. With appropriate adjustments it could become the standard system serving all Army elements everywhere. There would seem to be several distinct military and economic advantages in such a system.

Main Values in MASS

Already mentioned is the fact that MASS would conform to the main concepts likely to characterize future warfare. It might even be said that those tactical and strategic concepts will remain largely theoretical unless we develop a logistical system capable of supporting them in practice.



Private First Class Vivian K. Hudgins at the consoles of a transceiver that is a link in the network that ties the Army Signal Supply Agency in Philadelphia with four Signal depots (Sacramento, Calif., Decatur, Ill., Lexington, Ky., and Tobyhanna, Pa.) and a Signal Corps stock control point at Orléans, France. The use of such an electronic data transmission system speeds the interchange of logistical information with consequent faster service for Army units using Signal Corps equipment.

Strategically, an over-all modern army supply system would permit greater concentration of supplies at points farther away from potential or actual combat zones. In case forces need to be dispatched on short notice to some faraway trouble spot, they would be able to travel light, confident that most of their supplies, beyond immediate combat needs, will follow along as needed.

Tactically, the dominant feature of MASS appears to be flexibility of operations. So long as direct support units can transmit the supply needs of fast moving combat elements to the appropriate rear supply points, those elements can be supported. The electronic systems for processing and transmitting their requests are engineered to handle almost any required volume of traffic without major adjustments of organization or operating techniques. For example, an army control center could serve a half-dozen corps with practically the same administrative facilities it requires for serving a single corps. The


transportation job would naturally increase according to the number of troops being served, but the increase of paper-line traffic would hardly be felt by the computers and transceivers.

The possibilities for economy in money, materials, and men seem almost unlimited. Savings in the millions of dollars are now being realized by the already mentioned use of computer-transceiver techniques in certain operations of Ordnance Corps and Adjutant General Corps.



ALL in all, the whole Army has a big stake in Project MASS, not merely because of its probable future effect on supply procedures, but even more for its potential application to other logistical problems such as mobilization and procurement.

Only the experts know what goes on inside the brooding intellects of data-processing machines. The rest of us don't need to learn. We know that the machines can help us do our job. That's all we need to know.

Statisticians, Like Marilyn Monroe, Have Discovered That Curves Influence People



How's Recruiting in Area A?



SLIDE-RULE

COLONEL W. C. HALL

SOME cynic has described a staff study as a devious path from an unwarranted assumption to a foregone conclusion. The staff study is apt to be accompanied by charts, since the statisticians, like Jane Russell and Marilyn Monroe, have discovered that curves influence people.

Both the commander and the staff officer must have an understanding of statistics and charts in order to arrive at the correct solution based on a proper analysis of the data presented.

How is Recruiting?

Let us suppose that the recruiting record in a purely hypothetical area is as follows: second quarter (fiscal year) average, 1,040; January 1,030; February 1,060; March 1,075. Is this a good or bad record?

The top graph at your left indicates that it is bad. It appears to be practically at a standstill. And if we add some information, such as the fact that we spent more money in the third quarter than in the second, we indicate a definitely unfavorable situation.

Suppose, however, that we truncate, or cut off, the bottom of our chart at 1,000, as in the bottom graph at your left. Now the curve looks different. Now if we explain that January is always a bad month because of weather, and indicate an improvement over the third quarter of the previous fiscal year, we have an optimistic report.

How is recruiting? You are the commander. You must decide, based not only on the curves but on an unbiased evaluation of the available data. Recruiting may be good, but all considerations should lead you to that conclusion.

What Will Steel Do?

Financial pages do on charts showing steel production and so let's do the same. Based on the record, what are our estimates for the future? The chart at the top of the opposite page indicates clearly that steel production was lower in 1954 than at any time since 1949. It also shows wide annual fluctuations. Based on this curve alone, would you estimate 1955 production above 95 million tons?

On the other hand, the chart under it shows that there

WARFARE

How to detect the built-in bias in curves and other seductive come-ons

has been a steady increase during the last half of 1954. If this keeps up, 1955 might be a record year exceeding 1953's 111 million tons.

Which chart gives the better indication? Do we accept the long-range or the short-range trend? Actually, in 1955, steel production rode along with the boom to a record 115 million tons.

Other Tricks with Graphs

In the use of bar charts, we sometimes find bars of different thicknesses. If the data are represented by the length of the bar alone, then obviously the heavier bars give an exaggerated appearance. If, on the other hand, the data are represented by the area of the bars, the tendency is to minimize differences.

A change in scale may be employed. To illustrate, in the first chart on recruiting a quarter is compared with individual months. The average would be better shown as a bar three times as wide as the month bars. (The individual figures for October, November and December would be still better.)

The use of logarithmic or semi-logarithmic scales will flatten a curve 100 or more times. The numerals 1, 2, 3 become 1, 10, 100 if the scales are transformed to log scales.


Projections into the Future

This is the most dangerous kind of chart or graph. It is possible and frequently necessary to estimate requirements or production, but all available factors must be considered. The tendency of the chart is to oversimplify acts to inhibit full weighing of all elements. The charts on steel production show this. They show nothing but trends according to past production and omit such things as new steel production scheduled to go into operation during 1955, backlogs of orders going into 1955, and all the facts we knew about domestic and world trade, finance, and other facets of business known at the time.


Use of Tables

Statistics in tabular form are not, generally, so prone to

Steel Production—Up or Down?




Steel Output—1945-54




Where You Cut Depends on How You Cut

3 Successive Cuts of 4%



12% Reduction in Strength



give exaggerated impressions as graphs. There is, in addition, less tendency to oversimplify. But even in this field data must be examined with caution.

One common trick is the use of different average figures. The "mean" of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 10 is obtained by adding the numbers and dividing by their number: $20/5 = 4$. The "median," on the other hand, is that number in the middle of the list arranged in order of magnitude—that is, 3. Sometimes, the average is determined from the extreme elements only: $11/2 = 5\frac{1}{2}$.

The average temperature of two cities might be 78 degrees F. in each case, but while Honolulu has a range of from 65 to 88 F., the other (I won't name it; I may be stationed there some day) might have a variation of from minus 10 to 110 F. Which has the better climate? Without considering range, an average may be meaningless.

Percentage reductions

Recently I ran into a new statistical weapon—the integer. While I was a G4, a representative of the local comptroller's office asked me to concur in the reductions in strength indicated in the table below, to meet an overall four per cent cut.

Office	Officers	4% Cut	Reduction in Officer Strength
G1	11	0.44	0
AG	51	2.08	2
G2	30	1.20	1
G3	36	1.44	1
G4	16	0.64	1
Engr	19	0.76	1
Ord	15	0.60	1
QM	13	0.52	1
Signal	10	0.40	0
Trans	13	0.52	1
	225	9	

It appeared to me that G3, for example, with 36 officers, could afford to lose two officers with less difficulty than any of the smaller sections could lose one.

When I was unable to make headway with this argument, I proposed that G4 as the coordinating section for

the technical services, group these sections together, take the required cut and apply it where it would hurt the least. I was able to get away with this argument, with the result that, taking 4 per cent of the total of 86, we came up with a reduction of 3.44, or 3 instead of 5.

We've had fractional horses in the Army, but never fractional men. Since a fraction, or rather, percentage, of 0.51 equals 1 when we are confined to integers, and 1.49 also equals 1, a lot of maneuvering is possible in this field. For example, in our table, three successive cuts of 4 per cent would reduce G3 and G4, each, by 3, whereas a single reduction of 12 per cent would hit G3 for 4 and G4 for only 2. Where you cut may depend on how you cut.

Is It Proper Propaganda?

A good graph or chart is a desirable instrument for illustrating facts. People are more readily influenced by charts than by words.

The commander and the responsible staff officer must be assured of the validity of his graphics. The data must be correct. They should neither omit an element nor smother one factor with another. Tanks, for example, cost so much more than the other items of equipment in an armored division, that the costs of equipping these divisions will vary almost as the costs (if numbers are equal) of the tanks.

Colonel William C. Hall, Corps of Engineers, has been a contributor to ARMY and its predecessors for many years. His "A Medal for Horatius" (January 1955) has established its place as a classic of military humor. No other article from this magazine has been more widely reproduced—by civilian and service publications, sometimes with and sometimes without credit or permission. Colonel Hall is a 1931 graduate of the Military Academy who transferred from the Infantry to the Engineers in 1936. He has just finished his year at the National War College.

Let's Get Going

New Combinations for

If we combined the costs of maintaining light planes and helicopters, the cost would lie between the two and likely be meaningless.

The interpretation of the data must be objective, and be made by someone technically qualified to understand the operation being charted.

The Skeptical Attitude

And what else can the commander do? In addition to analyses by his staff, the commander should maintain a skeptical attitude and not hesitate to ask questions. Even on technical matters, he should insist on common-sense answers.

Once when General Patton and members of his staff were inspecting the construction of a bridge over the Rhine River, the engineer in charge explained that he was saving several days' construction time by using the abutments of a blown bridge and setting vertical posts for his piers through holes blown in the old bridge floor which had dropped as a unit. It was explained that this procedure was feasible since the bottom was firm.

"How in hell do you know that?" was Patton's question. "There must be a lot of rubble down there."

A considerable amount of probing indicated a hard bottom, but the General was right: one pier settled enough to cause extensive worry and repair.

One spring following a football season in which Michigan had beaten Ohio State 7-6 for the Big Ten title, the Ohio State coach invited Will Rogers to watch practice. The entire squad was engaged in practicing kicking extra points.

Said Will, "Don't you think that you should have someone practicing touch-downs?"

And speaking of specialists, it was a wise man who said, "Experts should always be on tap, never on top."

on Our Combat



GENERAL

WILLARD G. WYMAN

Says the CG of CONARC—

**We must do everything possible
in field experimentation to or-
ganize for combat around our
most modern weapons, stressing
mobility, heavy fire power and
strong, educated, determined
leadership**

If we are to avoid becoming a second-best army and face possible defeat in war, we soldiers must prepare now to master every advance made by science and industry. We must not wait for the battlefield to teach us what can be mastered now. We know how carefully the possibilities of the future are being studied, in theory and by experiment. But the point for soldiers is: how do we best use the tools in our hands at this moment?

It is unnecessary to emphasize that the problems of doctrine and organization are critical and require continued attention. By concentrating on these problems we will be able to stay ahead of the new developments. Our system is good. It is up to us to keep it that way. The commander who makes the most effective use of the weapons he has at hand will be successful in using newer ones as they come along. We

must constantly build around the weapons we have at the time.

Since the Civil War we have harnessed our forces to fire power and mobility. Out of this came our task forces. It is doubtful if there was a single regiment during World War II that did not, at some time, form a task force to accomplish a specific mission. However—and this is important—these task forces were always something new at the moment; something extemporized, and quickly thrown together to do a job. These forces comprised people who were strangers to one another—people who had not had the opportunity to work together before they tackled their mission. Military efforts, from the Civil War to the present, have been directed toward building organizations around fire power, rather than around people. But we haven't made a standing operating procedure out of it.

The Communists have exhibited such an utter disregard for human life that it is clear we must find the best available killing combination of men and weapons in modernized tactics, techniques and command procedures. Our efforts must be directed toward placing ourselves in a position to overcome any inferiority in numbers.

Flexibility in organization and disposition—now

The availability of atomic weapons makes it absolutely mandatory that we develop such flexibility in our organization and tactics that we will be able to retain a high degree of combat effectiveness in any situation, atomic or otherwise, and without being vulnerable to enemy atomic weapons. Specifically, this means that we must be fully capable of quickly breaking our large conventional units into smaller, powerful, semi-independent and highly mobile fighting units—for either offensive or defensive actions. And just as quickly, we must be able to reunite for massed effort. This is the key to the mobility concept.

It is entirely possible for us to have flexibility of organization and disposition *now* and in our *current* organizations, using the resources of equipment and weapons available. However, the complete development of mobility of this order depends on comprehensive experiments and the study of all the implications, including logistics. In the discussion which follows, platoon-, company- and battalion-sized units are used. The principles involved are basically the same as those which may be applied to larger units. It is the idea of flexibility of organization, or mobility, of dispersion, of self-sufficiency, and of greater fire power which is to be considered.

A simple illustration of one approach to the problem is provided by our doctrine of defense in depth. In a proper defense in depth we have small islands of resistance, widely separated over the most favorable terrain, so that each island is a power in itself with all possible weapons employed, and dominating the terrain between the islands. Destruction of any one of these islands of resistance does not threaten the defense as a whole because of the depth of the system and the proper employment of terrain.

Today, the effectiveness of the weapons that the infantry soldier can carry in his hands provides us with special advantages not only for the defense but also for offensive action. If he is properly led, given mobility and completely equipped with the family of weapons we now possess, the infantryman can dominate any ground on which he fights.

Build around weapons and mobility

Consequently, if we take our concept of defense in depth, equip each island of resistance with diversified weapons, make it mobile and apply its mobility to the ground as we do in its defensive concept, we approach the requirement of modern mobile warfare in offensive action. If we build around weapons and mobility, perfect the channel of command to insure command control, put greater emphasis on the development of junior leaders, and fully use all the technical facilities that American ingenuity has developed, we can defeat any probable enemy. This is true whether or not atomic weapons are used on the battlefield.

We can confront the enemy with a powerful, deeply deployed formation and we will have the means of concen-

trating heavily armed forces quickly to exploit the effects of our own massive fire power.

WITH this concept in mind, and after much thought and study had been devoted to the problem, a theoretical mobile-force organization was given an extensive test at Yakima, Washington, in 1954, during Exercise Hill Top, involving the 44th Infantry Division. Its purpose was to see how the task- or mobile-force principle could be applied by an infantry division with its present organization.

Instructions were issued by Major General R. F. Sink, the division commander, to include the following ideas in planning for Hill Top:

"Maximum consideration will be given to the organization of and actions by carefully organized, carefully tailored mobile task forces under strong leadership with maximum automatic and crew served weapons, to include appropriate medium artillery located at least in pairs so as to bring maximum fire power to the enemy at maximum ranges and all conditions of visibility. Forces so organized will be utilized for the offensive and defensive."


During the maneuver, the mission of the task force was to "strike the enemy with lightning speed by means of fire, maneuver and shock action in order to dislodge him, repel his assault, or delay him, before he had an opportunity to build up his strength at a critical point." The task forces were entirely mobile, self-sufficient, heavy in fire power, and utilized voice, visual and radio communications. They were capable of attacking, counterattacking, pursuing, delaying and defending.

Certain commands of the division were prepared to organize, assemble



General Willard G. Wyman graduated from West Point with the class of 1 November 1918 as a Coast Artilleryman, and transferred to the Cavalry in 1920. His service includes tours with Cavalry units, the service schools, as language student in China, topographer for the Andrews Expedition in Mongolia, and with the Chinese 19th Route Army during the defense of Shanghai in 1932. He served in Burma as General Stilwell's G3 representative with the Chinese 5th Army, and later as G3 of US forces in CBI. Transferred to North Africa in 1943, he became Chief of Plans Subsection of G3, Allied Forces Headquarters. He was assistant division commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Sicily, and from Normandy to Aachen. In October 1944 General Wyman returned to Fort Benning and took the 71st Infantry Division overseas and across Germany into Austria where it met the Russians at the Ems River. Postwar service includes tours with Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and as Chief of Staff of First Army. In December 1951 he took command of IX Corps in Korea. Following this he commanded

Allied Land Forces, Southeastern Europe, with headquarters in Turkey. In March 1954 General Wyman was named CG of Sixth Army and in August 1955 became Deputy CG of CONARC. He succeeded General Dahlquist as CG in March of this year.



Personnel	Vehicles	Weapons	Remarks
Hq Plat			
Comdr	1/4-ton		TOE weapons & equipment
Exec	1/4-ton		1 AW/VRT-10
Ops Sgt			1 AW/PRO-10
Com Off	1/4-ton		1 AN/GRC-9
Comm Sec:			1 AN/GRC-7
2 wire teams	2 1/4-ton		
1 radio team	1/4-ton		
1 Rifle Co	TOE 3 2 1/2-ton 6 2 1/2-ton	6 LMG cal. .30 1 MG, cal. .50 3 RL 3.5 3 Mortars 60mm 3 RR 57mm 18 AR cal. .30	Battalion provides 6 additional 2 1/2-ton trucks from Serv Co if distance precludes inf riding tanks
1 Tank Co	22 tanks M48 TOE 1 vehicle armd 1 vehicle Tk recon		12 2 1/2-ton trucks from Serv Co att to Tank Co for ammo and supply
1 AT Plat (HW Co)	TOE	6 RR 106mm 4 MG cal. .50 3 RL 3.5	Battalion provides
1 HM Plat (Regt)	TOE	4 Mortars 4.2 1 MG cal. .50 1 RL 3.5 6 how 105mm	
1 FA btry 105 how (Divarty)	TOE		

and employ a mobile force with a specific organization within a prescribed time. Elements of the mobile force not under the control of the commander responsible for organization of the force were attached from the next higher headquarters.

Each rifle company was prepared to

organize, assemble and immediately employ a mobile force organized into a platoon-sized task force composed of a provisional headquarters section; a fire section of one automatic-rifle squad and one LMG squad, and a support section of one 60mm mortar squad, one 57mm recoilless-rifle squad, and

one caliber .50 machine-gun squad.

Each infantry battalion was prepared to organize, assemble and employ on one hour's notice, a mobile force organized into a company-sized task force composed of a provisional headquarters and service platoon; a TOE rifle platoon (rifle company); a TOE weapons platoon (rifle company); a TOE tank platoon (regimental tank company); and a provisional heavy-weapons platoon (battalion heavy-weapons company).


Each infantry regiment was prepared to organize, assemble and employ on two hours' notice a mobile force organized into a battalion-sized task force composed of a provisional headquarters and service company; a TOE rifle company; a TOE regimental tank company; a provisional heavy-weapons company; and a provisional artillery battery. It should be noted that TOE units or elements thereof were used to form the provisional companies and batteries. Therefore, the basic teams—organizations that had trained together in the TOE units—were left undisturbed.

BEFORE Exercise Hill Top began, particular stress was placed upon communications and battle-drill training. Attack "battle drills" for the battalion- and company-sized forces were rehearsed, using each of the following tactical formations:

Tank elements, with all or the bulk of infantry elements attached acting as the assault echelon; heavy weapons forming the support echelon; tank elements as the assault echelon; infantry and heavy-weapons elements forming the supporting echelon; and infantry elements as the assault echelon; tank and heavy-weapons elements forming the support echelon.

Another useful formation would be of reinforced platoon size, these platoons to be employed separately and deployed within mutual fire-support ranges of one another for mobile offensive or defensive types of operation.

During the regimental and divisional phases of Hill Top the battalion- and company-sized mobile forces were employed. They were enthusiastically accepted by the 44th Division. However, necessary restrictions upon their use did not permit exhaustive tests. Safety factors restricted firing. The general tactical situation and maneuver control frequently inhibited their use. The platoon-sized mobile force was not used because of the inexperience of com-



Personnel	Vehicles	Weapons	Remarks
Hq Plat			
Comdr (Capt)	1/4-ton truck	TOE	
1 Sgt			AN/PRC-10 Regt provides 2 1/2-ton trucks for ammo and supply
Comm chief	1/4-ton truck		
2 radio ops			
Messenger			
Wireman			
1 Rifle plat (+)	2 1/4-ton trucks	TOE plus	Regt provides 2 1/2-ton trucks
	2 2 1/2 ton trucks	1 mortar 60mm 1 RR 57mm	
1 Tank plat	1/4-ton truck	TOE	
	5 tanks 90mm		
1 Mortar sec (Hw Co)	2 1/4-ton trucks	TOE	Regt provides 2 1/2-ton truck
	2 1/2-ton trucks		
1 AT Sec (Hw Co)	3 1/4-ton trucks	TOE	
1 Intel Sq (Bn)	1/4-ton truck	TOE	
1 Med Det (Bn)	2 1/4-ton trucks	TOE	
	(litter)		
1 Tank Maint Sec (Regt)			

(Rifle plat personnel will normally ride on tanks. For extended distances the 2 1/2-ton trucks will be used.)

pany commanders in the employment of mobile forces.

The battalion-sized mobile force was effective during the regimental phase. It advanced rapidly following detonation of a simulated atomic bomb to exploit the enemy's confusion in the vicinity of ground zero, and to continue the advance to seize a regimental objective well forward of the main line of resistance.

In the division phase, it passed through the main line of resistance at a given point, and executed a movement to seize critical terrain far forward of the line of departure. Following the detonation of an enemy atomic bomb on the friendly MLR, the force advanced rapidly to seize high ground in the vicinity of ground zero and acted as a blocking and/or counterattacking force until the friendly MLR was re-established. The force was scheduled for rapid advance following the friendly detonation of an atomic bomb, attacking through friendly infantry with the mission of seizing critical terrain well forward of the MLR, and linking up with a similar unit from the regiment on the left flank.

The company-sized mobile force was indispensable during Exercise Hill Top. In the regimental phase, it was used as a part of a covering force for the 44th Infantry Division while the division established a defense line. The force was sent out approximately six miles forward of the proposed division MLR and withdrew in the face of superior enemy forces.

In the division phase, this force conducted an armed reconnaissance forward of the friendly MLR and withdrew as required by increasing enemy pressure.

More experimentation,
more training

Here are some conclusions drawn on the performance of mobile forces during Hill Top:

There was very good reason to believe that many of the missions of the 44th Division might well have been performed by three of the provisional battalion mobile forces, backed up with artillery, all operating as a team.

It was found that it is practical SOP to form mobile forces within the organic resources of the infantry division.

It is most important to experiment further in the organization and training of such forces in our combat units as organized today. This will give units the opportunity to develop strong leaders with the proper education and experience in the employment of a mobile force. This will also afford an opportunity for practical development of sound tactics, techniques and doctrine.

The exercise showed that there is a need for development of appropriate equipment to include alternate means of communications which are guaranteed not to fail and are invulnerable to enemy jamming.

SOME time later the 2d Infantry Division under Major General T. S. Timberman carried its own interpretation of the use of mobile forces into its maneuver in California during Exercise Surf Board. Profiting from the experience of General Sink, Surf Board still further developed the thought on the use of mobile forces.

We have seen how the 44th Infantry Division employed units, organized under today's concepts, to the greatest advantage in the face of the most modern and available weapons. Our second


problem in the "mobility concept" is vividly described by Lieutenant General James M. Gavin in his article, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses" [Army Combat Forces Journal, June 1954], for carrying out certain phases of the old cavalry mission. General Gavin envisions units equipped with automatic weapons and lightly armored vehicles designed to use air transport for the major portion of their mobility. This has far-reaching implications. Such forces should be readily available and with a minimum of prepara-

tion would be capable of rapid assembly and commitment. Speed and mobility must be normal in modern warfare.

We must continually work on developing our infantry organization. This will prepare us for early training of troops, as new weapons, their combinations, and new doctrine are tested and approved. As flexibility, mobility, and fire power are extended, our troops should immediately study the theory of these new tools in offensive and defensive employment.

UNITS working along the lines of thought suggested here must have maximum ground mobility. Fundamental groupings of weapons should have the capacity to be organized into heavily gunned "floating islands" of great fighting potential. Fire power must be well forward, never less than a combination of two weapons of the same kind. Flat- and high-trajectory weapons must be teamed. Communications must be completely adequate to insure meticulous control. Units will require particularly strong, educated and effective leadership.

Varying types of organization for these mobile forces and groupings of weapons can be made up from current tables of organization. The principle we seek in our combinations of crew-served and automatic weapons, tanks, and artillery is to obtain optimum fire power on offense or in a mobile type of defense in depth. We must get away from rigid doctrine.



Personnel	Vehicles	Weapons	Remarks
Hq			
Comdr (Lt)	1/4-ton truck	TOE	1 AN/PRC-10
Plat Sgt			5 AN/PRC-6
Asst Plat Sgt			
Messengers			
Med Aidmen			
Rifle Squads, Weapons Squad, RL-Team			
1st rifle squad	3 1/4-ton trucks		
2d rifle squad	2 1/2-ton truck		
3d rifle squad	2 1/2-ton truck		
LMG team			
RL team			
Alt squads			
Mortar Sq	2 1/2-ton truck		
RR sq			

Vehicles with driver and radios provided by CO or Bn

1. Asst plat sgt will normally ride in third 2 1/2-ton truck with attached squads.
2. Plat sgt and med aidman will normally ride in first 2 1/2-ton truck.
3. AN/PRC-10 radio with comdr.
4. AN/PRC-6 radios with comdr, plat sgt, asst plat sgt, 1st Sq leader, and Mortar Sq leader.

Basic combat groups from existing units

By using combinations of weapons such as these, for practical testing and experimentation, supported and protected by riflemen, and by adding highly mobile transportation and adequate communications, an organization can be made up to form a basic combat group from existing TOE units. Perhaps three such units could be used to form the next higher echelon of the combat element for the next experimental step. Following this same buildup, if we add heavier weapons at the next organizational level—106mm recoilless rifles, 105mm howitzer tanks, 4.2-inch mortars—plus adequate transportation and communications, we will have a unit capable of delivering an intense volume of fire. This unit will be capable of operating over wide frontages or in great depth with each basic

(Continued on Page 69)


In Military Assistance,

TRAINING WILL BE THE PAY-OFF

The billions of dollars we're spending to arm our allies
will be largely wasted if we fail to follow through
with a carefully planned and executed training program

Illustrations by Lt. Col. Lachlan M. Field, on MAAG
duty with Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa

LTCOL. JOHN DIBBLE, JR.




REMEMBER Sergeant Baker's Sad Sack, armed with a mine detector, leading an imposing array of mechanized might up a winding Italian road? The division commander who dreams of his beautifully equipped, maintained and manned outfit becoming deployed in such a way is having a bad night.

Sometimes, as in Sergeant Baker's cartoon, terrain forces a commander to violate good tactical practices, but in many cases such conditions can be traced to a poorly conceived tactical plan or to inadequate training.

And that is what we may be faced with in our Military Assistance Program (MAP) if we don't follow through with a good training plan.

Most of the weapons and equipment we planned to give or sell to foreign

Lieutenant Colonel John Dibble, Jr., Artillery, graduated from West Point in 1940. During World War II he commanded the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion and later served on the staff and faculty of The Artillery School. He is a 1953 graduate of the Command and General Staff College and is now on duty in the Pentagon.



countries have been delivered. This makes a lot of people in and out of the services think that we have just about reached the end of the road so far as MAP is concerned. But, to make a comparison with the activation of one of our own units, we are only approaching the end of the initial equipping phase.

After initial equipping comes the training phase

A lot of money—nine billion dollars, to be exact—will be spent before this phase is completed. This, when added to what the countries themselves can provide, will take care of more than two hundred divisions with air and naval units lined up on our side. Forty-four foreign countries will have the means to resist or assist in resisting any menace to the free world.

After all this money is spent, and all the supplies are delivered, we enter the individual and unit training phase on a large scale. The success of this training, sparked by an enthusiasm and determination to bring our allies to a

razor's edge of efficiency, will determine the payoff that we will get out of our nine billion dollars.

We wouldn't think of equipping a new division and then leaving it without a training plan or training officers. Yet that is what happens when we deliver weapons to a foreign nation and fail to follow up with training help. Gear either piles up, unused, in depots or in ports or finds its way into the hands of unfriendly forces. Our only insurance against this kind of tragic national failure is an ample, vigorously pursued training program.

FROM the time the present Military Assistance Program started in Greece and Turkey, training has gone hand in hand with the shipment of supplies. During the equipping phase, the bulk of training has concerned itself with maintenance, supply procedures and equipment operation. This has resulted in a continually increasing number of officers and enlisted men being assigned to duty with military assistance advisory groups and missions. Today,

there are more than seven thousand officers and enlisted men on this kind of duty all over the world. More than three thousand of them are required for the Army's training mission alone. During the six years that MAP has been in effect on a large scale, approximately twenty per cent of the officers of the Army have served as advisors with foreign armies.

Some of the advisor posts are most desirable. Others are so primitive that they require great personal sacrifice by the officers assigned to them. The advisors who serve in the locations least desirable from the standpoint of convenience are usually working with the forces of relatively underdeveloped nations. This means that their job is to build strength and military ability where it was previously either nonexistent or completely outdated.

Advantages of the U.S. schooling program

One of the objectives of MAP is to develop leaders and instructors within the forces of foreign nations, so that



they can run their own show with only a minimum of supervisory assistance from the United States. This will eventually permit us to withdraw most of our advisors and it will boost the pride and self-sufficiency of the countries. To arrive at this objective we constantly bring foreign officers and enlisted men to the United States to attend our service schools or to get on-the-job training with troop units, depots, hospitals and arsenals. Out of the total mutual defense budget of nine billion dollars, the amount that the Army has spent on training foreign military personnel in the United States is only thirty million dollars. However, those with experience in the program—both military advisors and officials in the State Department—say that we are getting comparatively more out of the few millions we are spending on training foreigners in the United States than we are getting out of any other part of MAP. This statement is made in appreciation of the fact that without matériel assistance the training program would in many cases have little value.

This training is of the greatest value to underdeveloped countries. The richer and stronger nations in Europe have worked with us before. Many of them had already been taught our systems and adopted them in their own armies. Weapons standardization groups have been established to further mutual understanding and agreement. Many of their people have travelled in the United States or have family ties here.

However, in many of the countries of the Middle and Far East there has been only the vaguest understanding of the United States or its military system. Even their system of leadership has been as different from ours as day from night. Colonialism and suspicion of the Western nations color their thinking. We have found that the best way to overcome this is to bring them to the United States. The impact of visits by students from even the most advanced and wealthy of our allies is difficult for us to imagine. The nearly complete elimination of class distinction, the comparative luxury in which the average American laborer lives, the

extent and modernization of our industry and our facilities for military training are conditions that appear marvelous to visitors from Europe and miraculous to the visitors from a poverty-stricken, underdeveloped country.

What kind of schooling and where?

Army training in the United States is offered in several forms. The most sought after are the regular courses at the Command and General Staff College and at each of the combat-arm and technical and administrative branch schools. It is at this level that we train the staff officers and commanders who on their return to their homelands can influence their armies to adopt United States Army practices, doctrine and organization. Our MAAG chiefs have found that relatively junior staff officers and commanders haven't enough rank to get across what they have learned when they get home, and so it is essential that the training program include high-ranking officers. Thus we invite high-ranking officers to attend



YOUR UNIT'S HISTORY

Here are histories of proud fighting outfits—perhaps *your* outfit. Many are brilliantly written. All are sound, solid, combat history of World War II. Do you know the history of the unit you served with then, or are serving with now? You should.

Battle History of the 1st Armored Division. (*Howe*). The history of the division that developed much of our WW II armored doctrine. \$6.50

The Old Breed. (*McMillan*). History of the 1st Marine Division. One of the best written of all WW II histories. Superb maps. \$6.50

The 1st Cavalry Division in WW II. (*Wright*). Many details of the Philippine campaign. \$3.00

The 1st Cav. Div. in Korea. \$4.50

The 3rd Infantry Division History. (*Taggart*). Detailed history of one of the greatest of all WW II outfits. Accounts of fighting in N. Africa, Italy, Southern France, the Rhineland, Austria. \$6.00

The 3rd Marine Division. World War II campaigns in the Central Pacific. \$5.00

The 4th Marine Division in WW II. (*Proehl*). \$5.00

Spearhead. The WW II history of the 5th Marine Division, including the savage Iwo Jima battle. \$6.50

From Salerno to the Alps. A concise, one-volume history of Fifth Army's long battle for Italy. \$6.00

The 27th Inf. Div. in World War II. (*Love*). The Division's Pacific battles, including the controversial Saipan action. \$10.00

29 Let's Go! (*Ewing*). Complete history of the 29th Inf. Div's actions in Europe, including the bitter D-Day fight for a beachhead. \$5.00

Workhorse of the Western Front. (*Hewitt*). Battle history of the 30th Inf. Div. in Europe, including Mortain and other hard-fought actions. \$4.00

Combat Forces Book

Service

1529 18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

our regular courses, and recognizing that most high-ranking officers cannot afford the time for a whole year for schooling, we conduct special courses for them.

At the present time, there are seventy-eight foreign officers attending the regular course at Leavenworth and a total of 193 attending advanced courses of the schools for infantry, artillery and armor.

Obviously and unavoidable limitations make it inadvisable to invite foreign officers to schools above the Command and General Staff College level. Most of our specialist and associate courses are open to foreigners. Consistent with security restrictions, every effort is made to give them the same instruction as their American colleagues.

In addition to formal training, foreign students can get training as observers, working side by side with our own troops at service schools, depots, maintenance facilities, hospitals and in troop units. Also, observer training tours are conducted with the Department of the Army's staff agencies. Very often, the foreign student will attend one or more formal school courses and will also receive observer training.

Misunderstanding sometimes arises over the fact that orientation and observer tours are primarily for training and are conducted on a relatively austere basis. Students are not encouraged to bring their families, and entertainment is held to a minimum. Orientation tours and observer training are not suitable for VIP visits; officers who hold positions equivalent to deputy chief of staff or higher are usually not included in such programs.

The problems of numbers and quotas

The appearance of strange uniforms sometimes makes it appear that we are training a larger number of foreign officers than is really the case. We realize that our training facilities are restricted, and often wonder if all this emphasis on training officers from friendly nations isn't at the expense of our own forces. However, the number of foreigners whom we are training is comparatively small—many believe it's too small. From the time in 1950 when the mutual assistance training program started, up through the fall of 1955, we have trained only eleven thousand foreigners in U.S. Army service schools in the United States. This eleven thousand is out of over five million men,

or about two-tenths of one per cent. This number is small when we remember that all the key military commanders and government officials of satellite countries are trained and indoctrinated in the Soviet Union.

For several reasons, it is hard for many of our friends to fill their quotas at our schools. One of the biggest reasons is that even though MAP pays for the student's transportation within the United States, his tuition, his per diem, and for many countries even the student's transoceanic travel, the cost of the training is often too expensive for the country and the student. This has been the complaint of the chiefs of some of our major MAAGs who point out that by pinching out a few pennies here and there in the name of economy, we may do serious harm to the most effective part of the program.

Another reason for not filling quotas is the difficulty of finding students who speak enough English to pursue a course successfully. This is particularly true in technical courses which demand a technical background. It's a tribute to the MAAG chiefs, attachés, and the nations which we are assisting, that there are as many qualified foreign trainees in this program as there are.

To expand the program for training foreigners above the number that can be trained in the United States we are sending some to our Army service schools in Germany, Japan, Korea, Okinawa and Panama. This solution has the advantage of being less expensive than training in the United States. It cannot, however, offer as complete or extensive training as we can present in the United States, and it doesn't give the student an opportunity to visit and see our country. Training overseas and training in the United States are each only a part of an integrated program. They must be combined to make it complete.

In the years to come we must increase our emphasis on this kind of training and open new courses to friendly nationals. Financial and language barriers must be removed. It's almost too obvious to mention that we are in competition with an adversary who will not hesitate to capitalize on any mistakes we may make in this important activity. The benefits to our nation can be large and lasting if we make it a success. Failure would be disastrous.



General
L. L. LEMNITZER
C-in-C, UNC-FEC

UNC / FAR EAST COMMAND

Lt. Gen.
E. J. ROGERS, JR.
Chief of Staff



Maj. Gen.
A. G. TRUDEAU
Dep.C/S, Plans



Rear Adm.
L. S. PARKS
Dep.C/S, Ops&Adm



Maj. Gen.
H. C. PARKS
Asst. C/S, J-1



Brig. Gen.
J. G. FOWLER
Asst. C/S, J-2



Maj. Gen.
P. W. CARAWAY
Asst. C/S, J-3



Maj. Gen.
H. R. MCKENZIE
Comptroller



Col.
H. L. NELSON
Adj. Gen.



Col.
R. R. VAN STOCKUM
Hq. Comdt.



Lt. Col.
E. P. HOGAN
PIO



Rear Adm.
M. H. HUBBARD
Asst. C/S, J-4



Maj. Gen.
D. B. STRICKLER
Asst. C/S, J-5



Col.
L. B. RAMSEY
Sec. Jr. St.



Col.
S. M. BRUMBY
Sec. Jr. Com.



Gen.
L. S. KUTER
Comdr. FEAF



Vice Adm.
W. M. CALLAGHAN
Comdr. NFFE



Gen.
I. D. WHITE
CG, AFFE-8th Army



Maj. Gen.
E. J. MCGAW
CG, 1st Cav.Div.



Lt. Gen.
R. M. MONTAGUE
CG, I Corps



Maj. Gen.
E. J. BUTCHERS
CG, 7th Inf.Div.



Maj. Gen.
R. G. GARD
Sen. Mbr. UNCMAC



Lt. Gen.
J. E. MOORE
Dep. Gov. Ryukyus
CG, Rycom-IX Corps



Maj. Gen.
C. F. FRITZSCHE
Chief, Korean MAG



Maj. Gen.
T. A. WORNHAM
CG, 3d Mar.Div.



Maj. Gen.
S. B. MASON
CG, 24th Inf.Div.



Maj. Gen.
W. S. BIDDLE
Chief, MAAG, Japan



Maj. Gen.
J. W. HARMONY
Chief, JMAG, Korea

ARMY magazine
photorecord

1 JUNE 1956

PLAN NOW TO ATTEND

Second Annual Meeting

ASSOCIATION OF THE U.S. ARMY



Sheraton-Park Hotel

Washington, D.C.

October 25 • 26 • 27

1956

If you see a dog team heading down from Nome next October displaying a banner reading "Washington D. C. or bust" you'll know that it's an alert member of AUSA heading for our Second Annual Meeting.

It will be well worth his trip, too. He'll join fellow members of AUSA in a three-day session that will highlight the new plans and developments which are our modern Army's finest ever.

Headed by the Secretary of the Army, Wilber M. Brucker, and the Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, the program will include participation by many key Army leaders. Top men from industry, commerce and the professions will join forces with the military planners in the panel groups to discuss the complexities of warfare in the hydrogen age and the Army's vital role in the security of the United States.

To show AUSA members what's new in the fields of weapons, vehicles, aircraft and equipment the Technical and Administrative Services of the Army will display their newest wares during Friday and Saturday afternoons at Fort Myer.

Key industrial firms have taken exhibit space in the Sheraton-Park Hotel to display and demonstrate new items of military interest in their respective fields.

On the lighter side, the program includes a cocktail party for the Chief of Staff on Thursday night, a luncheon and banquet on Friday and a concluding luncheon on Saturday. The schedule has been drawn up to allow time for additional soirees at the discretion and/or initiative of the individual members.

Yes, the Second Annual Meeting of AUSA will be well worth a dog-team trip from Nome so plan now to mush on down to Washington next October.



Thursday 25 October 1956

- A.M.—Registration, Industrial Exhibits, Career Management
P.M.—Welcome—President AUSA
Opening Remarks—Chief of Staff U. S. Army
Army Symposium
Eve.—Reception for Chief of Staff U. S. Army

Friday 26 October 1956

- A.M.—Presentations and Panel Discussions
Noon—Luncheon, Fort Myer, Va.
P.M.—Military Exhibits and Demonstrations by Technical and Administrative Services U. S. Army.—Retreat Parade.
Eve.—AUSA Annual Banquet—Secretary of the Army—Principal Speaker

Saturday 27 October 1956

- A.M.—Business Meeting AUSA—Installation of New Officers and Council of Trustees.
Panel Discussions
Noon—Luncheon—Chief of Staff U. S. Army—Principal Speaker.
P.M.—Industrial and Military Exhibits

Other Activities

In addition to the regular program, arrangements have been made with the Adjutant General and Career Management to set up appointments for visiting members to discuss Career Problems. Appointments for examination of 201 Files may also be made in advance. Transportation to the Pentagon and other Army installations in the Washington area for the conduct of business will also be available.

Housing

Rooms will be available in the Sheraton-Park Hotel at special military rates for active duty members. Reservations will also be taken for BOQ Billets from active duty members. Transportation from BOQ Billets to Sheraton-Park will be provided. Advance reservation applications will be published in the next issue of **ARMY**.

Registration

Registration fees for the meeting will be \$8.00 for Military Members in uniform and \$10.00 for non-military members. Registration includes tickets to the Chief of Staff's Reception and the luncheons on Friday and Saturday. Banquet tickets will be \$7.00 for Military members in uniform and \$10.00 for non-military members. Advance Registration applications will be published in the next issue of **ARMY**.

THE MONTH'S READING

We depart from formula this month to present **Nikita S. Khrushchev's** views on Stalin's conduct of the Second World War. This is taken from the text of the secret speech Party Secretary Khrushchev made to the Twentieth Communist Party Congress in Moscow on 24-25 February. The text of the speech was released by the U. S. Department of State on 4 June 1956. In releasing it the Department stated that it understood the version was prepared for the guidance of leaders of the Communist Party outside of the U.S.S.R. "The Department of State does not vouch for the authenticity of the document and in releasing it intends that the document speak for itself," a statement said.



ONE MYTH FOR ANOTHER

From military genius to military idiot

THE power accumulated in the hands of one person, Stalin, led to serious consequences during the Great Patriotic War.

When we look at many of our novels, films and historical "scientific studies," the role of Stalin in the Patriotic War appears to be entirely improbable. Stalin had foreseen everything. The Soviet Army, on the basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called "active defense," i.e., tactics which, as we know, allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stalingrad.

Using such tactics the Soviet Army, supposedly thanks only to Stalin's genius, turned to the offensive and subdued the enemy. The epic victory gained through the armed might of the Land of the Soviets, through our heroic people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film and "scientific study" as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.

We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has a tremendous significance not only from the historical, but especially from the political, educational and practical point of view.

What are the facts of this matter?

Before the war our press and all our political-educational work was characterized by its bragging tone: when an enemy violates the holy Soviet soil, then for every blow of the enemy we will answer with three blows and we will battle the enemy on his soil and we will win without much harm to ourselves. But these positive statements were not based in all areas on concrete facts, which would actually guarantee the immunity of our borders.

During the war and after the war Stalin put forward the thesis that the tragedy which our nation experienced in the first part of the war was the result of the "unex-

pected" attack of the Germans against the Soviet Union. But, Comrades, this is completely untrue.

As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany he assigned to himself the task of liquidating communism. The Fascists were saying this openly; they did not hide their plans. To attain this aggressive end all sorts of pacts and blocs were created, such as the famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Many facts from the pre-war period clearly showed that Hitler was going all out to begin a war against the Soviet state and that he had concentrated large armed units, together with armored units, near the Soviet borders.

DOCUMENTS which have now been published show that by April 3, 1941 [Sir Winston] Churchill, through his Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. [Sir Stafford] Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun regrouping their armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union. It is self-evident that Churchill did not do this at all because of his friendly feeling toward the Soviet nation.

He had in this his own imperialistic goals—to bring Germany and the U.S.S.R. into a bloody war and thereby to strengthen the position of the British Empire. Just the same, Churchill affirmed in his writings that he sought to "warn Stalin and call his attention to the danger which threatened him."

Stalin ignored warnings

Churchill stressed this repeatedly in his dispatches of April 18 and in the following days. However, Stalin took no heed of these warnings. What is more, Stalin ordered that no credence be given to information of this sort, in order not to provoke the initiation of military operations.

We must assert that information of this sort concerning



Khrushchev: "After the Party Congress we shall probably have to re-evaluate many wartime military operations"

the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory was coming in also from our own military and diplomatic sources; however, because the leadership was conditioned against such information, such data were dispatched with fear and assessed with reservation.

Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin May 6, 1941 by the Soviet military attaché Capt. Vorontsov, stated:

Soviet citizen Bozer . . . communicated to the deputy naval attaché that according to a statement of a certain German officer from Hitler's Headquarters, Germany is preparing to invade the U.S.S.R. May 14 through Finland, the Baltic countries and Latvia. At the same time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily raided and paratroopers landed in border cities.

In his report of May 22, 1941, the deputy military attaché in Berlin, Khlopov, communicated that ". . . the attack of the German army is reportedly scheduled for June 15, but it is possible that it may begin in the first days of June."

A cable from our London Embassy dated June 18, 1941, stated:

As of now Cripps is deeply convinced of the inevitability of armed conflict between Germany and the U.S.S.R. which will begin not later than the middle of June. According to Cripps, the Germans have presently

concentrated 147 divisions (including air force and service units) along the Soviet borders.

Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not taken to prepare the country properly for defense and to prevent it from being caught unawares.

DID we have time and the capabilities for such preparations? Yes, we had the time and capabilities. Our industry was already so developed that it was capable of supplying fully the Soviet Army with everything that it needed. This is proven by the fact that although during the war we lost almost half of our industry and important industrial and food production areas as the result of enemy occupation of the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and other western parts of the country, the Soviet nation was still able to organize the production of military equipment in the eastern parts of the country, install there equipment taken from the Western industrial areas, and to supply our armed forces with everything which was necessary to destroy the enemy.

Badly armed army

Had our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the army with the necessary matériel, our wartime losses would have been decidedly smaller. Such mobilization had not been, however, started in time. And already in the first days of the war it became evident that

our army was badly armed, that we did not have enough artillery, tanks and planes to throw the enemy back.

Soviet science and technology produced excellent models of tanks and artillery pieces before the war. But mass production of all this was not organized and as a matter of fact we started to modernize our military equipment only on the eve of the war. As a result, at the time of the enemy's invasion of the Soviet land we did not have sufficient quantities either of old machinery which was no longer used for armament production or of new machinery which we had planned to introduce into armament production.

The situation with antiaircraft artillery was especially bad; we did not organize the production of antitank ammunition. Many fortified regions had proven to be indefensible as soon as they were attacked, because the old arms had been withdrawn and new ones were not yet available there.

THIS pertained, alas, not only to tanks, artillery and planes. At the outbreak of the war we did not even have sufficient numbers of rifles to arm the mobilized manpower. I recall that in those days I telephoned to Comrade Malenkov from Kiev and told him: "People have volunteered for the new army and demand arms. You must send us arms."

Malenkov answered me: "We cannot send you arms. We are sending all our rifles to Leningrad and you have to arm yourselves." (*Movement in the hall.*)

Such was the armament situation.

In this connection we cannot forget, for instance, the following fact. Shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite army, Kirponos, who was Chief of the Kiev Special Military District (he was later killed at the front), wrote to Stalin that the German Armies were at the Bug River, were preparing for an attack and in the very near future would probably start their offensive. In this connection Kirponos proposed that a strong defense be organized, that 300,000 persons be evacuated from the border areas and that several strong points be organized there: antitank ditches, trenches for the soldiers, etc.

Moscow answered this proposition with the assertion that this would be a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work should be undertaken at the borders, that the Germans were not to be given any pretext for the initiation of military action against us. Thus, our borders were insufficiently prepared to repel the enemy.

Stalin refused to admit war had begun

When the Fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and military operations began, Moscow issued the order that Stalin, despite evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this was only a provocative action on the part of several undisciplined sections of the German army, and that our reaction might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the war.

The following fact is also known. On the eve of the invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite army a certain German citizen crossed our border and stated that the German armies had received orders to start the offensive against the Soviet Union on the night of June 22 at 3 o'clock. Stalin was informed about this immediately, but even this warning was ignored.

As you see, everything was ignored; warnings of certain army commanders, declarations of deserters from the enemy

army, and even the open hostility of the enemy. Is this an example of the alertness of the chief of the party and of the state at this particularly significant historical moment?

AND what were the results of this carefree attitude, this disregard of clear facts? The result was that already in the first hours and days the enemy had destroyed in our border regions a large part of our air force, artillery and other equipment; he annihilated large numbers of our military cadres and disorganized our military leadership; consequently we could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the country.

Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the beginning of the war, followed Stalin's annihilation of many military commanders and political workers during 1937-41 because of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations. During these years repressions were instituted against certain parts of military cadres beginning literally at the company and battalion commander level and extending to the higher military centers. During this time the cadre of leaders who had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East was almost completely liquidated.

The policy of large-scale repressions against the military cadres led also to undermined military discipline, because for several years officers of all ranks and even soldiers in the party and Komsomol cells were taught to "unmask" their superiors are hidden enemies. (*Movement in the hall.*) It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of military discipline in the first war period.

And, as you know, we had before the war excellent military cadres which were unquestionably loyal to the party and to the fatherland. Suffice it to say that those of them who managed to survive despite severe tortures to which they were subjected in the prisons, have from the first war days shown themselves real patriots and heroically fought for the glory of the fatherland.

I have here in mind such comrades as Rokossovsky (who, as you know, had been jailed), Gorbatov, Meretskov (who is a delegate at the present congress), Podlas (he was an excellent commander who perished at the front), and many, many others. However, many such commanders perished in camps and jails and the army saw them no more.

All this brought about the situation that existed at the beginning of the war and which was the great threat to our fatherland.

Stalin's defeatism and hysteria

It would be incorrect to forget that after the first severe disaster and defeats at the front Stalin thought that this was the end. In one of his speeches in those days he said: "All that Lenin created we have lost forever."

After this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct the military operations and ceased to do anything whatever. He returned to active leadership only when some members of the Political Bureau visited him and told him that it was necessary to take certain steps immediately to improve the situation at the front.

Therefore the threatening danger which hung over our fatherland in the first period of the war was largely due to the faulty methods of directing the nation and the party by Stalin himself.

However, we speak not only about the moment when the war began, which led to serious disorganization of

our army and brought us severe losses. Even after the war began the nervousness and hysteria which Stalin demonstrated, interfering with actual military operations, caused our army serious damage.

Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real situation that was developing at the front. That was natural because during the whole patriotic war he never visited any section of the front or any liberated city except for one short ride on the Mozhaisk Highway during a stabilized situation at the front.

To this incident were dedicated many literary works full of fantasies of all sorts and so many paintings. Simultaneously, Stalin was interfering with operations and issuing orders that did not take into consideration the real situation at a given section of the front and which could not help but result in huge personnel losses.

I will allow myself in this connection to bring out one characteristic fact that illustrates how Stalin directed operations at the fronts. There is present at this congress Marshal Bagramyan, who was once the Chief of Operations in the Headquarters of the Southwestern front and who can corroborate what I will tell you.

Refusal to face military facts

When there developed an exceptionally serious situation for our army in 1942 in the Kharkov region, we had correctly decided to drop an operation whose objective was to encircle Kharkov, because the real situation at that time would have threatened our army with fatal consequences if this operation were continued.

We communicated this to Stalin, stating that the situation demanded changes in operational plans so that the enemy would be prevented from liquidating a sizable concentration of our army.

Contrary to common sense, Stalin rejected our suggestion and issued the order to continue the operation aimed at the encirclement of Kharkov, despite the fact that at this time many army concentrations were themselves actually threatened with encirclement and liquidation.

I telephoned to Vasilevsky and begged him:

"Alexander Mikhailovich, take a map (Vasilevsky is present here) and show Comrade Stalin the situation which has developed."

We should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe. (*Animation in the hall.*) Yes, comrades, he used to take the globe and trace the front line on it.

I said to Comrade Vasilevsky: "Show him the situation on a map; in the present situation we cannot continue the operation which was planned. The old decision must be changed for the good of the cause."

Vasilevsky replied saying that Stalin had already studied this problem and that he, Vasilevsky, would not see Stalin further concerning this matter because the latter did not want to hear any arguments on the subject of this operation.

After my talk with Vasilevsky I telephoned to Stalin at his villa. But Stalin did not answer the telephone and Malenkov was at the receiver. I told Comrade Malenkov that I was calling from the front and that I wanted to speak personally to Stalin. Stalin informed me through Malenkov that I should speak with Malenkov.

I stated for the second time that I wished to inform Stalin personally about the grave situation which had arisen for us at the front. But Stalin did not consider it convenient to raise the phone and again stated that I should speak to him through Malenkov, although he was only a few steps

from the telephone.

After "listening" in this manner to our plea Stalin said, "Let everything remain as it is!"

And what was the result of this? The worst that we had expected. The German surrounded our army concentrations and consequently we lost hundreds of thousands of our soldiers. This is Stalin's military "genius"; this is what it cost us. (*Movement in the hall.*)

ON one occasion after the war, during a meeting of Stalin with members of the Political Bureau, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan mentioned that Khrushchev must have been right when he telephoned concerning the Kharkov operation and that it was unfortunate that his suggestion had not been accepted.

You should have seen Stalin's fury! How could it be admitted that he, Stalin, had not been right! He is after all a "genius," and a genius cannot help but be right! Everyone can err, but Stalin considered that he never erred, that he was always right.

He never acknowledged to anyone that he made any mistake, large or small, despite the fact that he made not a few mistakes in the matter of theory and in his practical activity. After the Party Congress we shall probably have to re-evaluate many wartime military operations and to present them in their true light.

Soviet military history to be reassessed

The tactics on which Stalin insisted without knowing the essence of the conduct of battle operations cost us much blood until we succeeded in stopping the opponent and going over to the offensive.

The military know that already by the end of 1941 instead of great operational maneuvers flanking the opponent and penetrating behind his back, Stalin demanded incessant frontal attacks and the capture of one village after another. Because of this we paid with great losses until our generals, on whose shoulders rested the whole weight of conducting the war, succeeded in changing the situation and shifting to flexible maneuver operations, which immediately brought serious changes at the front favorable to us.

ALL the more shameful was the fact that after our great victory over the enemy which cost us so much, Stalin began to downgrade many of the commanders, who contributed so much to the victory over the enemy, because Stalin excluded every possibility that services rendered at the front should be credited to anyone but himself.

Stalin was very much interested in the assessment of Comrade Zhukov as a military leader. He asked me often for my opinion of Zhukov. I told him then, "I have known Zhukov for a long time; he is a good general and a good military leader."

After the war Stalin began to tell all kinds of nonsense about Zhukov, among others the following, "You praised Zhukov, but he does not deserve it. It is said that before each operation at the front Zhukov used to behave as follows: he used to take a handful of earth, smell it and say, 'We can begin the attack,' or the opposite, 'the planned operation cannot be carried out,'" I stated at that time, "Comrade Stalin, I do not know who invented this, but it is not true."

It is possible that Stalin himself invented these things for the purpose of minimizing the role and military talents of Marshal Zhukov.

Comment of Readers on



OLD OUTFITS NEED NOT FADE AWAY

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL SAMUEL H. HAYS

was mentioned in 1960; and did not begin its present form as a combat unit until 1950. The first time the Division was involved in Korea in 1950, Sam Hays, at his later service date in a tank unit, sensed great cohesion among

The editor feels that the answer to both these questions will be a resounding "Yes." UNIT designations are here to stay.

some units. The 520th Infantry, for example, fought so well in Korea that it was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

Presently, the issue will soon be re-

vised, even though no specific date has been set.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SAMUEL H. HAYS

OLD OUTFITS NEED NOT FADE AWAY

The Best Alternative

Lt. Col. Samuel H. Hays

COUNT me as an enthusiastic supporter of the regimental concept as presented by Colonel Schmierer. We have been waiting for some such plan. Having served in several regiments, I, like most infantrymen, am only too well aware of our urgent need for unit cohesion built upon *esprit* and morale. Only the tightest and most cohesive units have stood up well under battlefield strains and stresses. Future combat will no doubt place even greater strains upon our units than we have experienced in the past. I am convinced that the truly effective strength of our army lies in the fighting heart of our regiments and battalions. Any steps which strengthen the priceless heritage represented by the regimental spirit are worth more to the Army than

any money or effort expended for them.

As I see it, there are only a limited number of alternatives if we are to break our regiments into battalion-sized combat units. First, we can convert regiments into combat commands with present battalion designations unchanged, activating such additional battalions with the same regimental designations as may be required without any central unifying agency or influence. Second, we can plunge into the numbers racket, numbering battalions through several thousands as they are formed and discarding the regimental ideal entirely. Third, we can employ the division as the central repository of *esprit* and tradition, numbering battalions consecutively within divisions, and using division history

As we go to press the postman brings further reader reaction to the regimental concept described by Colonel Schmierer in our May issue. Last month we published the comments of two readers. In this special section this month we publish five more. If other appear that add to the discussion we shall publish them in later issues. And as we promised in our editorial note with the original article, all letters and comment on this concept are forwarded to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel for study.

and traditions upon which to build. Fourth, we can adopt some type of regimental system for the combat arms which would unite active and reserve battalions in a common regimental structure.

Of these immediately apparent alternatives, only the last two appear to have much merit from the standpoint of the small-unit commander. Both give some foundation upon which to build unit consciousness and teamwork. However, my own past experience indicates that individual loyalty expressed by the majority of soldiers goes to the company and battalion, and at most the regiment. Whenever we tried to stretch this individual identification to units as large as divisions, the intense feelings of loyalty and cohesiveness became increasingly watered down. In addition, the divisional base, although attractive from many angles, appears to involve the abandonment of a long continuity of meaningful tradition which is of great value in erecting effective organizational structures.

HAVING mulled over the problem off and on for the past ten years, it appears to me that the regimental system would come nearest to solving the problem faced by the small-unit leader. This system should include these features: a home base for each regiment within a geographical area from which most of its members are drawn

The Way to Do It

Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze

OF course Colonel Schmierer is correct. That is the way to do it. Colonel Schmierer has put on paper in a convincing and proper way what has occurred to many of us in times past: take our cue from the British. More power to Colonel Schmierer.

and which is intimately connected with the formation and training of both active and Reserve battalions; a unifying regimental headquarters for the regiment's general welfare, commanded by a high-ranking officer possibly drawn from the retired list who is selected for leadership and long association with the regiment; a battalion rotation system tied into Gyroscope, which will assist in maintaining personnel in their base unit; permanent association of officers and men with a particular regimental unit; a replacement system incorporating the platoon packet idea, platoons being trained and furnished by the regiment's training battalion; a relaxation of uniformity in uniform to permit minor variations at least in headgear and accessories to assist in distinguishing between regiments.

inite and essential role in the active regimental mission, the regimental tradition will only remain preserved on paper rather than in the minds of our soldiers.

Essentially, the solution to our problem is one of carrying the General Staff concept to its logical conclusion. Why not use the active regimental headquarters group as the nucleus of a basic training establishment in the areas where the regiment had traditionally been established? The charge may be made that this is too evidently the British system—well, why not admit it? The British system has been tested in war and peace for decades without major changes. Our own personnel and organization planners have always shied away from the area recruiting concept as being too inflexible, restrictive, and not suited to the American demographic problem. Perhaps it is time for us to take another look at this problem. Population increase may actually favor an area recruiting system.

Obviously the use of a regimental training system would serve to maintain the regimental tradition and spirit as well as the name. The young man coming into the service from the San Francisco area, for example, would take his basic training with the 30th Infantry—"San Francisco's Own." He would be inducted at the old Presidio of San Francisco, be oriented by officers and NCOs who had served in the 30th and who would have probably made their permanent homes in the Bay area. From the beginning of his service he would become thoroughly acquainted with the specific historical background of his unit and its *esprit*, and develop a feeling of continuity of service. By subsequent service with active battalions under the regimental colors, both at home and abroad, he would absorb the full atmosphere and meaning of tradition. He would have found a real Army home.

On completing his basic training with the regimental training groups, the General Staff concept would take over: he would be assigned to one of the several battalions of the 30th which operated under a battle group, or a combat command. Should his initial tour of duty be in a Stateside battalion, there is no reason why, when his overseas tour is required, he could not then be assigned to another 30th Infantry battalion, whether in the Far East or Europe, since a regiment could and should maintain battalions in each of

It Will Fade Away

Col. Patrick D. Mulcahy

THE General Staff concept for preserving regimental tradition, outlined in the May issue of **ARMY**, may maintain the regimental name in a picture-scroll-colors sort of way, but will not keep its tradition from fading away. The regiment would indeed become the "institution" depicted by Colonel Schmierer, but within a few years this "patriarch" would probably become as extinct as the dodo! Without a continuing, active regimental participation, one can safely predict that gradually only the individual battalion traditions would be preserved. The inadequacy of the battalion was so well stated in the "Old Outfits" article that elabora-

tion is unnecessary.

How the regiment would actually be retained, other than in name, was unanswered. It was suggested that the regiment could remain organized purely on paper, with retired or inactive members forming a historical type of society to act as a repository of records and the like. Also considered, but apparently rejected in the same breath, was the possibility of maintaining a small cadre on active duty which could serve the same tradition-preserving role. Neither solution is realistic if one considers the effect of time and the frailties of our human memories. Without an active organization which has a def-

the major overseas commands.

The regimental training system might require more work on the part of our personnel and logistics planners. Perhaps the solution is almost too personal for those of us who have completely accepted the concept of mass production in our personnel and organizational planning. The payoff would be in terms of increased reenlistments, higher morale, better unit training and operational flexibility. These returns would more than warrant the extra work at the staff level.

Thinking ahead, one aspect of the over-all organization and training problem which might be helped in the long run by this proposal is the Gyroscope plan. Already the major operational bugs in the Gyroscope system in peacetime seem to lie in the total division aspect of the unit replacement plan. Many field commanders faced with the realities of implementing Gyroscope believe they may eventually have to use a subordinate unit rotation plan rather than the total division. Even more important the division in combat, we all must admit, will never be able to be replaced *in toto*. Battalions, it is suggested, might well be replaced completely during warfare as well as in peace, thus facilitating the always confusing transition to a different mobilization replacement system.

Let us consider the mobilization problem for a moment. Is there any reason why the 30th Infantry Regiment could not establish, in its general area, battalion cadres which would take in and conduct unit training with the regimentally trained replacements? These 30th Infantry battalions could participate in field exercises and maneuvers with the locally available combat commands and divisions, and then be available for shipment overseas.

To summarize, the merits of the proposed regimental training system are:
¶ It would serve to maintain positively our traditional Army combat units—not only in name but in reality.
¶ It would permit every soldier to become identified with a single regiment from induction to separation. With such a system our reenlistment problem might be solved to the point that separation in most cases would become retirement after a lifetime of traditional service, rather than a quick hitch in and out.

¶ It would amplify the stability sought for in the peacetime Gyroscope plan. California inductees would not be hauled across the continent to train in an unknown training center. Rather, they would train in a unit identified with their general geographic area. Later they could be shipped overseas with their regimental buddies to another battalion of their regiment. These shipments could be by individual packets or by rotation of the regimental battalion. This is the meaning of stability.

¶ Under this system we might increase our combat efficiency by reducing the number of nonfighters or nonfitters. Trained observers and research workers all tap their finger at the anonymity problem as one of the facts which makes for nonfighters. Certainly, if identified in the service with a traditional and local unit, fewer men would let down their unit or home town.

¶ In mobilization, the regimental training system would not only give us a straightforward basic training plan, but would give us the ability to make Gyroscope work in combat—that is, it would create a workable system of regimentally identified trained battalions, which would be available on a rotation basis for our overseas theaters.

sirable.

¶ Each regiment recruit from specific areas. In heavily populated centers a number of regiments would use the same area, but each area should not be larger than the average state.

¶ The reserve battalions of each regiment be located in the regiment's recruiting area. Primary source of personnel for the reserve battalions will be the regular battalions, and transfer should be automatic when men are discharged.

¶ The permanent home station of the regiment be at the nearest permanent post practicable to its recruiting area. At the home station would be the regimental commander, permanent headquarters, and a regular battalion or equivalent.

¶ The regiment would have direct administrative control of its reserve battalions and to the maximum extent possible of its regular battalions. Much DA administration could be decentralized to the regiment.

¶ A man would be assigned to a specific regiment and not be transferred to another without his consent. When not with regimental units he will be on detached service.

¶ Rotation of troops will be by battalion except when smaller units are involved. Replacements to maintain strength of battalions to be furnished by the regiment, regardless of location of battalions. Battalions returning from overseas will normally return to the permanent home post.

¶ Continuity of service between regiment and division will not be essential. It may be desirable to rotate, as the divisions will normally remain wherever they are stationed. Since usually not more than one battalion of a division will be rotated at any one time, the division will always remain at reasonably effective strength.

¶ Recruits can probably best be trained at training centers and then assigned to regiments. However, regiments should be responsible for as much of their own training as practicable, and specifically for the training of their reserve battalions. Summer field training should be under the direct control of regiment.

¶ The 191 regiments proposed may be too many. Each regiment should have at least three regular battalions, and four or five would not be excessive. No regiments should be entirely reserve, although National Guard regiments will not have regular battalions.

It Can Strengthen the Reserve

Maj. F. W. Wunderlich

COLONEL SCHMIERER'S article outlining the current thinking on retaining the regiment interested me greatly. This approach offers promise of solving one of the two great problems which have confronted the Army since World War II—maintaining unit

identity. As a reserve officer I believe it may also be the solution to the Army Reserve program which for ten years has defied solution. In amplification I suggest the plan either incorporate the following principles or permit them to be added at a later time if found de-

The position of regimental commander should be honorary for distinguished officers near the end of their service. There would be no objection to a general officer for this position, and it might be advisable.

Colonel Schmierer mentions the British system, which I know has worked admirably for many years. We have a similar national background and are faced with a distribution of troops all

over the world, which the British have coped with for many years. A close study of their system will enable us to profit from their experience.

When the problem has been solved I hope that DA will devote its attention to the second major problem I mentioned. That is the tremendous inflation of grade and rank, coupled with a downgrading of qualifications and responsibility which has occurred in recent years.

are efficiency, and discipline, and training, and morale, and spirit, and leadership, all in widely varying degrees.

Behind all the study and all the tests there must be no preconceived notions, no half-baked ideas gained through dramatic but limited experience. By all means let us have the bright young men, but also let us have the experience and wisdom of bright older men. Let us consult corps and division commanders of the widest military scholarship and practical combat experience. And these wise planners, both young and not so young, will take as one basic premise the certainty that there will be wars, both large and small, in which atomic weapons will not be used.

There exists today a growing body of intelligent thought which has arrived at the conclusion—and not by wishful thinking—that never again will atomic weapons be used either strategically or tactically. They believe the certainty of retaliation will stay the hand of any would-be atom or hydrogen user, just as surely as Hitler never dared use chemical warfare in the most desperate circumstances to save his country, his regime, or his life.

The next war will begin about where the last one left off, minus Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Among military men it is unnecessary to point out that the regiment is the most honored and loved of all military organizations, past and present. I will not dwell on this universally accepted point except to plead for no action which will undermine tradition and its accompanying spirit, without which no army of ours will ever be victorious. More than enough has already been done to cut the ground from under *esprit de corps*, discipline, soldierly pride, and morale. The current should be reversed, not hastened to catastrophe.

It may be asked why cannot the separate battalion become the repository of tradition and *esprit de corps*? Sometimes battalions do have outstanding spirit. It depends upon the battalion commander. But battalion commanders change too often. In the earlier days of a war when it is most essential to develop spirit, they are too inexperienced, and besides, the battalion is too small, too impermanent. After long and hard fighting there remain too few oldtimers to infuse their spirit into replacements. Too many casualties

Freshen Up the Label

Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Randle

THERE is a ditty I remember from many years ago. It goes something like this, to the tune of "Roamin' in the Gloamin':"

Freshen up the label,
It's a thing you've got to do.
Give 'em something old
And make 'em think it's something new.
Renovate, rejuvenate,
And incidentally change the date,
But don't forget to freshen up the label.

There is more than a little common sense in that jingle. If the product lacks merit, no amount of renovating or freshening up the label will sell it, particularly when a better one is on the market. But Procter & Gamble did not discard Ivory soap and throw generations of goodwill into the discard because the cake was unhandy, the wrapper old-fashioned.

The regiment has been the basic larger unit of armies for so long that a proposal, almost off the cuff it would seem, to abolish it altogether is astounding, unbelievable. How did it all start? What agonizing appraisal led to such a fundamental decision?

Perhaps I do a grave injustice, but I cannot help entertaining the suspicion that the proposal to abolish the regiment was looked on with favor before a substitute system was perfected and tested. From Colonel Schmierer's article the only clue to recent thought on organization indicates a division is to become a collection of separate battalions. In one respect that is not particularly new. Division commanders have always tended to think in terms

of battalions. But that does not mean they would, willy nilly, discard the enormous tactical, administrative, disciplinary, and spiritual advantages inherent in the regimental organization.

With the regiment eliminated, the division itself becomes a glorified reinforced regiment. Why not drop the division and let the corps commander direct the activities of a group of reinforced regiments? This proposal is simply to illustrate a point, and that is that present organizations with their historic nomenclature are remarkably flexible. A regiment, division, or corps can be almost anything tables of organization say it is. Why then is it now so urgent that, after hundreds of years, the one organization above all others which has proven so adaptable, must be thrown to the winds?

The brigade is gone. We are told the regiment will soon follow. This does not seem quite logical. With atomic weapons forcing even broader deployment, control becomes a herculean task. With less direction and control, somewhere along the line complete tactical, disciplinary, and administrative chaos will surely ensue.

CERTAINLY the best practical minds must continuously study organization. Their studies and conclusions must be tested. But tactical organizations are not neat squares and diagrams on a chart, to be adopted because the squares and colored lines look pretty and seem to satisfy a superficial sort of logic. Tactical organizations are soldiers, and officers, and generals, and equipment, and supply. They

in all ranks quickly water down whatever spirit the battalion once had.

Many, I think, will agree that during the war—all three wars, in fact—the most troublesome and undisciplined troops—those which most often brought discredit on the uniform—were service units. I am not blaming them. It was not their fault. They did good work, mostly, but the majority were not and never became soldiers. Good transportation men, surveyors, bakers, ordnance specialists, yes; but not soldiers. Why? Because for the most part they were trained and they operated in separate detachments, companies and battalions. Occasionally these service units had good spirit because the men came to know their work and took pride in it, but rarely did they have discipline.

There is no inherent incompatibility which prevents a man from being a good engineer, truck driver, or baker, on the one hand, and a good soldier on the other. But someone has to make a soldier of him. A top transport man from a trucking firm cannot because he does not know how.

Do we want all troops in our army to descend to the disciplinary level of service units? In World War I General Pershing said West Point would be the standard of discipline and training. Abolish the regiment and the service units will become the standard.

During training I would organize all service units of every kind into regiments under colonels who themselves are soldiers and can make soldiers of the raw material at hand, both officers and men.

A GOOD regimental commander is close enough to all his officers, and many of the noncommissioned officers as well, to exert a tremendous influence on the development, discipline, and spirit of the regiment. The division commander has too much rank, too many responsibilities, and too many other things to do to get very close to the officers and men who do the actual fighting. His greatest influence is applied through regimental commanders.

The British regimental system discussed by Colonel Schmierer has several good features, though it was adopted to solve problems not related to atomic war. For one thing, it gives jobs to many excellent colonels no longer up to the physical rigors of combat. But for fighting, the battalions are grouped into brigades which closely correspond to our regiments. There-

fore, as a matter of fact, the British still fight with regiments (called brigades). The regiment is a depot and training command, furnishing battalions to brigades (regiments), and providing replacements as needed.

This organization suits British requirements and they are used to it. I should hate to see it adopted by the U. S. Army, but if it is, I should much prefer to see the brigades become the depot and training unit, and the regiments the combat units.

Instead of dropping the regiment in our Army, it should be extended, and for reasons of discipline and spirit I have indicated. I would like to see the old artillery regiments revived. They had glorious traditions too. Even though battalions are sometimes widely scattered, much could be gained.

And why should not all division artillery be grouped into one regiment? Efficiency, spirit and discipline would be the better for it.

In conclusion I have a third reason for retaining the regimental organization. A great deal of confusion, work and expense will be saved, for the regiment will be back. It satisfies too many basic needs to be excised for long. In this connection I would like to quote from a man who will be read and quoted as long as the English language survives.

Be not the first by whom the new are tried,
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.

I point out that he does not suggest being the first to lay the old aside.

REUNIONS

2d Armored Division. 4-5 Aug. Atlanta, Ga. Write Secretary, PO Box 172, Alexandria, Va.

2d Infantry Division. 19-21 July. Plaza Hotel, San Antonio, Texas. Write Reunion Committee, 214 W. Agarita Ave., San Antonio, Texas.

4th Infantry Division. 9-11 Aug. Hotel Statler, Boston, Mass. Write Reunion Committee, Box 654, Boston 2, Mass.

5th Armored Division. 9-11 Aug. Brown Hotel, Louisville, Ky. Write Mrs. Roy S. Watrous, 8549 Lowell St., St. Louis 15, Mo.

6th Armored Division. 30 Aug. to 2 Sept. Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C. Write Ed Reed, PO Box 492, Louisville 1, Ky.

9th Infantry Division. 26-28 July. Hotel Morrison, Chicago, Ill. Write Stanley Cohen, Box 66, Livingston, N. J.

10th Armored Division. 31 Aug. to 3 Sept. Congress Hotel, Chicago, Ill. Write J. Edwin Grace, 172 Larch Road, Cambridge 38, Mass.

12th Armored Division. 2-4 Aug. Hotel William Penn, Pittsburgh, Pa. Write LeRoy W. Bensel, 2557 Main St., Lawrenceville, N. J.

25th Infantry Division. 20-22 July. Statler Hotel, Washington, D.C. Write Secretary, PO Box 101, Arlington 1, Va.

27th Infantry Division. 10-11 Aug. Biltmore Hotel, New York City. Write Victor Backer, 480 Lexington Ave., New York 17, N. Y.

36th Infantry Division. 7-9 Sept. Hotel Brownwood, Brownwood, Texas. Write 36th Division Association, Box 5068, West Austin Station, Austin 31, Texas.

41st Infantry Division. 2-5 Aug. New Washington Hotel, Seattle, Wash. Write Secretary, 526 NW Broadway, Portland 9, Ore.

80th Infantry Division. 2-5 Aug. Hotel Abraham Lincoln, Reading, Pa. Write Dr. M. W. Pilgram, 114 N. Main St., Pittsburgh 15, Pa.

82d Airborne Division. 5-7 July. Sherman Hotel, Chicago, Ill. Write Don Woods, 422 W. 66th Place, Chicago 2, Ill.

84th Infantry Division. 27-29 Aug. Hotel New Yorker, New York City. Write Bernard Grimm, PO Box 229, Covington, Ky.

88th Infantry Division (WWII). 8-12 Aug. Fort Shelby Hotel, Detroit, Mich. Write Charlew L. Williams, 1100 Majestic Bldg., Detroit 26, Mich.

90th Infantry Division. 9-11 November. Write Ernest L. Tutt, 4012 Windsor, Dallas, Texas.

94th Infantry Division. 12-15 July. Sheraton-Cadillac Hotel, Detroit, Mich. Write Elbert W. Ramsey, 20068 Glasdonbury, Detroit 19, Mich.

102d Infantry Division. 26-29 July. Hotel Roosevelt, New York City. Write Earl F. Hooper, 51 Highland Ave., Port Washington, N. Y.

101st Airborne Division. 31 Aug. to 1 Sept. Statler Hotel, Los Angeles, Calif. Write David K. Webster, 10346 Mississippi Ave., Los Angeles 25, Cal.

104th Infantry Division. 1-2 Sept. Hotel Morrison, Chicago, Ill. Write Dr. Joseph Lynch, 5138 S. Mozart St., Chicago 32, Ill.

106th Infantry Division. 23-28 July. Ambassador Hotel, Atlantic City, N. J. Write Douglas S. Coffey, 18 Cornell St., West Orange, N. J.

THE MONTH'S CEREBRATIONS

Use Your Authority Under Article 15

THE increasing tendency to punish offenders by special or general courts-martial rather than by summary courts or nonjudicial action ought to be viewed with alarm. Instead we hear that the company commander's disciplinary powers have been taken away by MCM 1951. But how many critics of UCMJ use Article 15 as it should or can be used?

MCM 1951 says that "charges against an accused, if tried at all, should be tried at a single trial by the lowest court that has the power to adjudge an appropriate and adequate punishment." Yet cases go to special or general courts which could have been dealt with very effectively either by a summary court or under authority of Article 15. I believe the reason lies in the fact that commanders do not take the time to thoroughly study the manual in the spirit with which it was written, or simply don't realize how much authority they have under Article 15.

For example, an accused goes before a special court for violating a minor local ground rule, and is tried under Article 92. The court calls witnesses (they must take time from their duties), the defense calls witnesses (more time lost). After a four-hour session the sentence is adjudged: a small fine. Such a case could very well have been handled by a summary court, and

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be put on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

even more effectively by the company commander using Article 15.

I believe that if this situation continues the integrity of our entire military justice system will be jeopardized. This integrity is lost when people reach a point where a court-martial becomes meaningless because minor offenses are tried by higher courts with insignificant punishment resulting. If the company commander were to exercise to the limit his rights under Article 15, we could effectively reduce the number of trials, thereby preserving the integrity of the system.

"That's all well and good," you say, "but why doesn't the convening authority bounce back a minor case into the company commander's 'In' basket?" I feel it has become habitual to approve the company commander's decision to refer such cases to trial. It's fine to back a subordinate, but no one is infallible. If we do a wrong thing over and over without being corrected, eventually it seems to be the right thing to do.

Here, I believe, is a solution. Correct justice procedures before the case gets to trial. In cases of minor infraction either dismiss the charges or order non-judicial punishment. Impress upon company commanders how much authority they have under Article 15, and enforce its use. Above all, don't make UCMJ a trivial thing through improper application. Our justice system, like any system, is only as good as the people who apply and enforce it.

LT. BERNARD E. FULLER



Why Not Coeducational ROTC?

WE soldiers no longer underestimate the importance of women in the Army. (At least I hope we don't.) Their invaluable performance in logistics and administration is not only equal to, but in many cases superior to, that of men. The WAC's greatest weakness is that they are too few, particularly in trained officers. The Army doesn't attract enough mentally and educationally qualified young women at the age when they can be best indoctrinated.

Why not admit women to ROTC? As a product of the ROTC, and with



three years' experience as an assistant PMST, I see many advantages and no disadvantages.

First, the question of money—one that always rears up when a new program is proposed. The ROTC is our cheapest source of officers, on a *per capita* basis. To admit women in coed institutions where Army units already exist would not increase the Army's capital investment appreciably. The operating budget would be increased less than the increased enrollment and probably much less in those schools where male enrollment is voluntary yet barely large enough to retain the unit. We already have instructor personnel, prepared classrooms, and training aids. Few, if any, special classes would be required, for specialized subjects could

be covered in the six-week summer camp at a WAC training center.

Secondary advantages can be clearly seen. A new generation of male officers would grow up knowing the place women have in the Army. Better yet, a new generation of women—in the active or reserve Army—would grow up knowing better the Army's role in protecting those things women hold most dear: their children and homes. As teachers, wives and mothers, they will better understand the Army's story and spread it. Let's not underestimate the power of a woman.

This program would not conflict with the WAC's present procurement program which offers direct commission in USAR to college graduates if they attend the training sessions at the WAC Center. When I was on ROTC duty at a coed teachers college, not one senior applied for a commission, although several lower-class coeds were interested in male ROTC activities. The program I propose would give coeds an opportunity now denied them and expand the base for the present one.

It should work fine within ROTC units. The "why" attitude will improve instruction. Quick mentalities will challenge the mettle of male students. Women can hold their own with men on the drill field and at the indoor range, and their participation in social affairs will be welcomed. Besides, the presence of women in ROTC units probably will increase male enrollment, especially in volunteer units.

Lt. COL. WILLARD L. JONES

To Read a Map Read the Ground

A SOLDIER who cannot read a map is like a duck that can't swim. Map reading requires a distinct reading skill that is in no way related to reading printed words, handwriting, music, radar scopes, photographs, and the like. All such reading skills have at least two things in common. First, all are based upon recognizing conventional signs and associating them with the terrain features, mental images, or sounds they represent. Secondly, the skill is not easily acquired.

We tend to forget the need for soldiers to know terrain thoroughly so that they can use it to fight well either on foot or when mounted. Many graduates of our service schools become so adept at solving map problems that they are apt to view all problems as map problems. They seem to prefer solving their problems on maps rather than solving

them by visiting or visualizing the ground. If there are no maps, they have no "situations" to which to apply the principles and techniques they have mastered. If a map is strange or, worse, inaccurate, the solution may be unreal-



istic and even dangerous. They are easy prey for opposing leaders who solve their problems on the ground, accepting the best available map or substitute as a representation of the ground.

There is evidence of considerable

THE MONTH'S CEREBRATIONISTS

Lt. Bernard E. Fuller, Signal Corps, has served on the faculty of The Signal School and now commands a signal service company in the Far East. He contributed "In Defense of Army Schools" in October 1955.

Col. Parker M. Reeve, Corps of Engineers, was Engineer of the 25th Infantry Division in WWII. Before becoming Deputy President of CONARC Board No. 3 at Fort Knox, he was successively Engineer of each of the three commands in Japan.

Lt. Col. Willard L. Jones, Artillery, on duty in the office of the Chief of Military History, makes his third appearance in ARMY. He contributed a Cerebration in April, and "Targets of Opportunity" in June.

Colonel Advocate is the pseudonym of a Reserve officer who contributes regularly to ARMY.

Col. Robert H. Douglas, Infantry, is a 1933 graduate of USMA, and commanded a battalion of the 99th Division in WWII. He is Director of the Staff Department, TIS, and is slated to attend AWC.

impatience in commanders with the patent inability of many subordinates to read maps. In our army intensive reinstruction and repeated examinations in map reading are usual. Perhaps, in stressing map reading, we overlook the need for teaching ground, or the appreciation and use of terrain, as essential prerequisites for learning about maps and how to read them. In the main, the experience of new soldiers with ground is not so intimate as it was decades ago. In general, today's map-reading student never views the ground purposefully from anything like the prone position under fire or from the driver's seat in a buttoned-up tank. He cannot recognize in nature the features and characteristics he is taught to see on a map. Few of us remember how, as infants, we learned to read pictures. Some of us can recall a child's terror at first sight of a real cow, horse or locomotive which was such an attractive little picture in a book.

Let's spend more time teaching ground in the beginning, and how the soldier can use it for fighting and for living. When the student understands terrain and how to use it, he will accept maps and substitutes as conventionalized representations and soon learn to read them. He will learn to use them as printed forms on which to record details he has observed and which do not appear on them, or as a means of transmitting ideas to others who have not seen what he has. Initially it may take longer than present methods, but we shall have a better soldier, who will not need periodic coaching to enable him to pass a map-reading examination. There is no royal road to map reading, but map reading comes readily to one who knows ground.

COL. P. M. REEVE

Review the Combat Awards System

I RECALL an article in the *Infantry Journal* some years ago that was inspired by the volume of comment protesting inequities in the award of World War II decorations. It called for the rectification of injustices to people who, having been awarded the Legion of Merit for gallantry, or for gallantry plus achievement, found themselves at war's end possessing a noncombat decoration which six months later was dropped from fourth to fifth in order of precedence.

An editorial footnote said: "We agree heartily. It seems to us that something can be done about this. And we plan

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to publish whatever the Awards and Decorations Branch has to say about it."

To date nothing has been said, for without action by the Army itself there is nothing to say. Perhaps the number of persons was small; but the injustice was great and should have been corrected on the records.



The Navy and Marines authorized a V device similar to that for the Bronze Star Medal, to be worn on the ribbon of the Legion of Merit. I am assured by members of those services that they regard the LM with V as a respected combat decoration. Why doesn't the Army, which sanctioned the award of the V device for the Bronze Star, follow through on the Legion of Merit?

It is not simply a matter of righting a wrong, but one of fulfilling a requirement as well. There are types of heroism which cannot be covered by the "one shot" criterion for awards of the DSC and the Silver Star. Awards and decorations are meant to promote morale, so in administering the system, the greatest care should be taken to avoid practices that might affect morale adversely.

When we aren't at war, very few people think about combat awards. However, if the system is to be perpetuated, as it certainly must be, we can use this time to review doctrine, correct past errors, and develop new standards based on requirements that might arise in future wars. Actions which should be considered include: authorizing the V device for the Legion of Merit; authorizing a decoration for evaders, escapers, and soldiers who conduct themselves gallantly while in enemy hands; further simplifying the process of recommending awards; examining current award requirements and revising them where necessary.

Improvement of the awards system, even to the point of perfection, is only half the battle. Before the system can be properly implemented it must be understood by all Army personnel. Human nature being what it is, injustices can never be eliminated; but they can be minimized if common standards are adopted.

It seems to me that such training, conducted during peacetime, could be

most interesting and a morale booster. It could include lectures on the origins of old and new medals, with examples of the types of action for which they were and are to be given. Instruction in preparing and processing recommendations should be required. Practical training could be held during field training exercises, running from submission of recommendation to presentation ceremony. Simulated awards for conduct in sham battle might stimulate interest in striving for the real thing in combat.

Sometimes I think the whole business of awards and decorations overlooks two good proverbs: (1) Whatever is worth doing at all, is worth doing well and (2) The little things are what count the most.

COLONEL ADVOCATE

Make Mine Airborne—All the Way

I AM not familiar with postgraduate assignment of airborne enlisted men, but it seems to me we can improve the system now used for officers who are airborne qualified. The situation we have is that there are many more officers trained as parachutists than there are vacancies in airborne units or jump spaces to which they can be assigned, particularly in field grades. Ideally, an officer would receive an airborne assignment, or at least an opportunity to be placed on jump status, immediately after completing airborne training. No doubt this is being done in the airborne divisions, but it is not so with many officers trained at Fort Benning.

Take my own case. I completed airborne training two years ago, but so far have had no opportunity to jump. This may sound like sour grapes but I don't think it is. I would not have volunteered if I hadn't wanted and expected to jump regularly.

Your Army Is Mobile

and so are you. Sometimes you're so mobile that your copy of ARMY can't catch up with you because we don't know where you are at the moment. If a change of assignment is imminent, fill out DD Form 415 or Post Office Form 22-5 (don't forget to PRINT your name) and

CIRCULATION MANAGER
1529 Eighteenth St., N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.
send it to:

While the practice of informally rotating airborne assignments among old jumpers is understandable, it does not offer much opportunity for the newer jump-qualified people to remain really airborne qualified. Of course, there should always be a hard core of old experienced jumpers to give stability to airborne units, but jump spots shouldn't be monopolized by old timers.

The situation with regard to airborne-qualified officers resembles the one in the master sergeant grade: there are just too many of them. Some years ago the Department of the Army discovered that more officers were receiving specialized civilian education at government expense than there were vacancies. The result was that assignments to such specialized education were curbed.

We should devise a system whereby the details to airborne training bear a more logical relation to the number



of jump slots available by grade. We gain little by jump-training an officer and then forgetting him. Besides, morale suffers when, after the build-up of enthusiasm that jump training creates, graduation fails to bring forth an airborne assignment. It seems to me the number of jump spaces could be calculated and the detail of officers to airborne training controlled to prevent building up a large backlog of qualified officers who will never get a chance to use their airborne training. We can reserve a small percentage of jump slots for the hard core of jumpers, allot a sizable share of slots to young newly qualified jumpers, and control the detail of senior captains and field-grade officers so that they will be assured of getting at least a one-year hitch in an airborne unit after graduation.

How can you go all the way if at the end of jump training you know you will revert to the same type of assignment you had before you went airborne?

COL. ROBERT H. DOUGLAS

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

A Prod in the Right Direction

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL DECISIONS

By Roger Hilsman
The Free Press, 1956
187 Pages, \$4.00

Reviewed by
DR. GEORGE S. PETTEE

One of the most interesting outward symbols of the changes in the world in our lifetime, and of the place of the United States in the world, is the growth of intelligence as an activity of our Government. From the tiny roots which existed only twenty years ago there have grown a group of agencies with thousands of employees. It is well understood that these are necessary, and that they bear a very important part in the conduct of American affairs as an active world leader. But they are new, in many ways they are strange to the American scene.

The examination of these intelligence agencies and their role and their work is one of the most interesting avenues of introspection on the whole of the great adaptation which has occurred in American relations to the world. Roger Hilsman has approached the study of intelligence activities in the U. S. Government with the tools of a social scientist as well as the interests of a political scientist. In his concern for the relation of intelligence to policy decisions, sharp attention is given to intelligence in the State Department and to intelligence for the National Security Council, and less attention to military and to some of the other specialized areas in the intelligence field. Hilsman's main concern is to find out what people think intelligence work is, in order to further examine and criticize the existing beliefs on the subject. His approach is effective.

Aside from the main thesis of the book which may have great value but may not have the same meaning to all readers, the book will certainly have great value to all students of intelligence for the survey which it accomplishes incidentally in the course of examining the attitudes of all concerned. Hilsman begins with a short historical summary of the growth of the present system of agencies, with sharp focus on the apparent intentions of the architects of the system. He proceeds to deal with the views of policy makers on the nature and proper functions of intel-

ligence. He then analyzes the attitudes which they expressed to him in a series of analytic interviews. He then examines the attitudes and ideas of the administrators of intelligence agencies, as he finds them in the written record of those of the high intelligence administrators who have left substantial public writings on the subject, namely, Donovan, Vandenberg, Hillenkoetter, McCormack, and Allen Dulles. Next he turns to the working level of people in the intelligence agencies themselves, and finally to those whom he call "the academic observers," namely, those who have attempted more or less serious studies or statements on the nature of the intelligence function, George S. Pettee, Sherman Kent, and Willmoore Kendall.

There are places where this discussion drags, repetitiously, but this reviewer for one finds it pardonable because only by hammering almost *ad nauseam* can the case be made emphatic that the operators

Dr. George S. Pettee is on the staff of Operations Research Office of The Johns Hopkins University, and wrote *The Future of American Strategic Intelligence* (1946).

Col. James Warner Bellah, *Infantry*, USAR, novelist, short-story and screen writer, has appeared frequently in *ARMY*. His last review was in the April 1956 issue.

Col. Charles A. H. Thomson, *Infantry*, USAR, is also a frequent reviewer. He is on the staff of The Brookings Institution in Washington.

Eugene F. Hart is a civilian on duty in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army.

Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong, *Ordnance Corps*, Retired, last served as President of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and is Past President of the American Military Institute.

Col. Charles W. McCarthy, *Infantry*, is a member of the Executive Council of AUSA, and is on duty in the Washington area.

N. J. Anthony is Associate Editor of *ARMY*, and has reviewed several works on the Civil War period.

and administrators and the working level share certain attitudes and beliefs and ideas about intelligence which actually amount to a dominant doctrine.

Hilsman's analytic tools are those of a trained social scientist, and they do not lack cutting edge. In examining the prevailing state of mind, his perceptions cut through the superficials and reach the heart of the matter.

There is in our intelligence agencies, and in the larger operating agencies and policy making bodies which they serve, a system of ideas about the nature of intelligence work which makes first-class intelligence work nearly impossible. Hilsman's major finding, though he does not state it so baldly, is that the whole system is conditioned by a shallow philosophy. The ideas as to the nature of knowledge, the nature of facts, the usefulness of concepts and theories, and the relation of knowledge to action are too simple. The object of intelligence is conceived as getting facts. Facts are conceived of as neat little propositions which can be gathered like marbles or pebbles. The best worker is the one who gathers the most facts. Putting the facts together involves nothing more complex than the assembling of a jigsaw puzzle in which all the parts must certainly fit together. By implication, the facts are of finite number. So much is this so that it is often assumed that if an intelligence agency obtains all the facts the high officials served can then examine all the facts. In short, Hilsman has applied the sort of technique which Malinowski applied to the culture of the Trobriand Islanders or which Thurman Arnold applied to "the folk lore of capitalism," and has discovered what may properly be called "the folk lore of intelligence." His chapter on "The Operators and Their Attitudes" contains the most interesting and penetrating analysis of the matter.

His final plea is that "Certainly in the creation of new knowledge the role of thought is vital," and that "To be rational, the bringer of knowledge should work in a context of policy and action; the implementer should act within a frame of knowledge." One is tempted to quote back at him a remark of Thomas Mann. "One must think like a man of action and act like a man of thought." Our intelligence agencies will be as good as they should when they and the authorities

they serve come closer to that standard. Hilsman's book should give them a good prod in the right direction.

Foreign Policy Today

RUSSIA AND AMERICA: Dangers and Prospects
By Henry L. Roberts. Foreword by John J. McCloy
Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, 1956
282 Pages; \$3.50

Reviewed by
COL. CHARLES A. H. THOMSON

In May 1953, the Council of Foreign Relations set up a study group of former Government officials, atomic scientists, scholars and experts in the area of Soviet studies, and men with broad experience in business and industry. This group discussed problems creating world tension, especially those relating to Soviet-American relations, searching for policies and actions that would tend toward peace. Dr. Henry L. Roberts, Columbia historian and new Director of the Russian Institute there, supervised researchers who fed staff papers to the study group, and produced an over-all paper summarizing their broad conclusions. The result is difficult reading, partly because it is an effort to summarize group rather than individual views. But it is important reading, because it summarizes the consensus of an intelligent, well-balanced, sober and responsible group of public men, free of daily cares and operating decisions, concerning future relations between the two world powers.

John J. McCloy, former High Commissioner in Germany, contributed a long foreword giving his perspectives on the future of American foreign policy. He reaffirms his conviction that the purposes of the Soviet leaders have not changed, although their tone and style have become softer and more dangerous. He decries Soviet stark colonialism in East Germany, calling for renewed cultural contacts with these and other satellite peoples, hoping for a new framework of a United Europe within which old nationalisms and antagonisms can be swallowed up. He calls for a new community of understanding and effort, and new perspectives on our policies toward the uncommitted nations and colonial areas. He senses new importance for the problems of the Middle East, asking for more American study and awareness of their special problems. As to armaments, he demands that we keep up our nuclear guard, but not restrict our policy to this commitment.

Breaking the atomic deadlock ought to be a major policy objective, but the initiative we can develop lies in the field of peace rather than in preparation for war. Reduction of conventional armaments must accompany or precede nuclear disarmament, under proper supervision and control. For the psychological war-



The Little Man in the campaign hat was a plain dirt soldier

riors, McCloy demands not only that we understand people abroad better, but that we gain and project a more realistic and believable image of ourselves. Our foreign policy must be clarified, and the United States must act in community with all nations which are working toward greater freedom.

"In the next decade, the great opportunity and the great need is to communicate to peoples throughout the world our sense of partnership in the liberal revolution which began two hundred years ago."

The book itself is in three parts. The first examines the nature of the problem of our foreign policy, as affected by the relations of the atom to Communist totalitarianism, and the resultant strengths and vulnerabilities of both systems. The second sets forth American policy requirements. The third outlines areas of conflict: Germany, the East Europe satellites, Communist China. A final chapter on the outlook asserts that our fate is not foreordained; that by keeping ourselves strong we can reduce the Soviet threat and cut their room for maneuver; that we shod the issues between us from the realm of naked violence into the realms of constructive competition.

The study advocates balanced military forces in being, able to cope with any military eventuality. Its flexible, probing approach rules out any easy and simple answers. But for anyone who wants to grasp the scope of foreign policy today, and trace out its major implications into military preparations and policy, this book is a careful and suggestive guide.

Broken Hearts, Withered Souls

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Command Problems
By Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland
Office of Chief of Military History, 1956
518 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.25

Reviewed by
COLONEL JAMES WARNER BELLAH

Although the authors deny that this is a definitive history they would have a difficult time defending their thesis because the source material they have used is so inclusive as to leave scant doubt that

any additional source will be uncovered which could radically change their presentation of the facts of the North Burma Campaign of 1943-44—which is the time bracket these 518 pages devote themselves to.

Unlike other books on the subject, this official history is completely objective.

Using British and Japanese sources, what Chinese sources are available, and official documents as well as pertinent data from General Stilwell's private diaries and papers, it seeks less to present a glorious sweep of continuity to a little-known and most complex theater of operations—and seeks more to present that complexity in all of its ramifications and to bring some order out of what, at times to those who served in CBI, seemed utter chaos.

To this day it is the experience of CBI veterans on any level, that meeting another veteran of the Theater, the odds are long that they not only never met in the Theater, but the odds are much longer that they, at the time, never even heard about what overall project the other man was engaged in—and the odds are longest that as each widens the other's horizon with his talk, a sear or a lug will drop into place in the mind of each and suddenly, after fourteen years, the light will dawn and a segment of the complete action will clarify in each man's mind and he will realize at last that the dysentery, the Nagu sores, the malaria, the angry sullen clash of allied personalities, the futility, the heartbreak and the eternal misunderstandings were not in vain.

For such men, whose curiosity is still not blunted, Stilwell's *Command Problems* will provide many rewarding hours of enlightening study and the Little Man in the Campaign Hat will rise to his exact stature in history.

To career officers who had no personal knowledge of the Theater, the volume offers a definitive critique of what can happen (but perhaps never did before in all history) to a plain, dirt-soldiering division commander who had a language qualification on his record and a period of service in an odd corner of the world in peacetime that qualified him to go back in war.

Going into the Theater on a middle level in 1943 as I did, I sought briefing on arrival. It ran something like this: "There are three efforts on the front. It is over five hundred mountainous and jungle miles long and no contiguous flanks exist to any of the three efforts—only a connecting light railroad. Efforts Numbers One and Two are British [Arakan and Manipur] and fairly static [September, 1943] because when the war is over the British intend to relinquish India and Burma anyway—so why fight for the privilege? One supposes that India Command [Auchinleck] exercises overall control of those two British efforts but don't expect the Indian Army in any great force in the field because to maintain a *status quo* in India it will undoubtedly be kept in garrison against political repercussions. Effort Number Three [Ledo-Hukawng]—the farthest out from base—is Stilwell's. His troops are Chinese. The British don't particularly like having the Chinese in Burma because their political claims along the Salween River are older than the British claims. But Stilwell has a cut-and-dried mission to prosecute the war against Japan with any means at his disposal. That means fight. Stilwell doesn't particularly like the British and a lot of the British reciprocate. Chiang Kai-shek needs Stilwell on this side of the Himalayas, because he's got his own war on the other side with Chennault. Stilwell distrusts Chiang Kai-shek. On top of this fairly simple problem, Admiral Mountbatten has arrived to set up and command a Theater of Operations. How will this conflict with Auchinleck? With Stilwell? Would you care to have a drink?"

Not for one moment do I wish to imply that Stilwell's *Command Problems* indicates that General Stilwell alone brought order out of this chaos. A semblance of unification was brought to the Theater, but it was not one man's doing, it was the result of the sum total of little efforts on the part of many little men who cut through conflicting intents, a potpourri of opposed political aims, bitter surface jealousies, poor liaison, inertia and sloth—with one basic belief in mind—that Burma was a part of global war and that the Burma part—as well as the broad, dramatic sweeps across Europe—had to be prosecuted to the fullest in order that universal victory might be attained. No man wounded or killed in Burma, bled or died in vain.

You will see Admiral Mountbatten in this study rise slowly to stature as a theater commander—see his conflict with Stilwell resolved in mutual—if reluctant—respect. You will know the British General Slim who spoke Stilwell's language as well as Stilwell spoke his. The great engineers stand forth (for primarily it was an engineer's and TC theater), Wheeler and Pick, without whom nothing else

would have mattered. Merrill of the Marauders, and Boatner, casting his later shadow on Korea before him. England's Festing, Ferguson and Lentaigne.

You will see actions in a climate and under conditions that broke men's hearts and withered their souls. Small actions in the main, but so desperately important at the time for the overall picture that no substitute for victory was tolerable, regardless of resources.

The volume is heavy on the supply factor—with tonnages and comparisons. Possibly the greatest single effort in the Theater was the soup-up of that Bengal-Assam connecting railway—the impossible—done not quite but almost at once.

What the book does is to broaden the entire horizon. So much was written so quickly afterward, to relieve frustration, that it is a great relief to find a careful study made at last. That it focuses on General Stilwell is only natural for he was the senior United States Army officer present, and as such took the severest beating. And he was a man who could take it, lose—and survive. In this volume, one sees all the pressures and strains develop. It goes outward to the Chiefs of State conferences, to the thinking of the Combined Chiefs and contracts again to twenty yards of noisome jungle. The honest men stand forth. The self-seeking opportunists shrivel to their true dimension.

It is not a story of a campaign, it is a magnificent analysis of all the elements that go to make up a successful campaign, and as such is the most important contribution to have been made so far. One doubts very much if anything significant can ever be added to it.

There were those among us who shuddered a little bit when the publication of Stilwell's private papers was announced, for he was a plain-spoken man and a hard man who called a spade a spade—and no one who knew him well in Burma wanted his memory tarnished in the minds of strangers who did not know the full import of the conditions he faced. Those papers selected by the present authors for this book take nothing from him in dignity—but rather add to the humanity of the man. And humanity was his greatest virtue.

Wearing four large hats most of the time—CG US Army Forces, CBI; Deputy Supreme Allied Commander SEAC; CG Chinese Army in India; and CG Northern Combat Area Command—there were a dozen minor caps he had to pile on his head at various temporary other times. That he growled mightily on occasion is not to be wondered at when it is realized that he probably suffered from the most intense, compound headache of the entire war.

There was another glib Theater slogan of the time: "Who commands who around here—and who pays?"—but I think it came to *reductio ad absurdum*

when Stilwell went to see the British General Slim at Fourteenth Army headquarters at Comilla before proceeding to his own troops to take command in the field, technically under Slim. "As Army commander," Stilwell grinned, "have you any orders for me before I start to fight the war in the Hukawng?" Slim shook his head. "No," he said, "but before you go, have you, as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, any orders for me, as Army Commander?"

Much water has gone down the Tanai, the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy since the campaign ended, but all of the blood, the oil and the dirty sweat is in them still in the pages of this book. There were dramatic moments of slight tactical import and long, unsung months of drudgery that paid the longest dividends. The balance given to all factors by the authors is the exact balance of impersonality, carefully considered, carefully weighed, objectively presented. As a final analysis of the Burma Campaign of 1943-44, they leave no tiny area for anyone else to police.

Logistics Comes of Age

THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II;
The War Department: Global Logistics and
Strategy, 1940-1943
By Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley
Office of Chief of Military History, 1956
780 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; \$6.25

Reviewed by
EUGENE F. HART

Logistics is a decisive weapon of modern warfare. Although this fact has not long been recognized, the point is pretty well established in this volume.

If wars were a commodity that could be graded as good, medium or bad, the next one would probably be a "good war"—much "better" than the last one; good in the sense that logically many of the pitfalls, deficiencies and bloopers of the last need not be repeated.

Just as effectively, the authors have chronicled successes of this period that will be helpful to logisticians and commanders of the next war.

In addition to being authentic and well-documented, the book contains occasional anecdotal passages that provide a degree of warmth too often lacking in works of this sort. An example is a short note General Somervell sent General Eisenhower prior to the North Africa landings. Somervell wrote: "God knows, Ike, we wish you the best of luck and outstanding success. The Country needs one badly and if anyone can give it to them I am sure you can."

The book also seems to point up the solid value of our promotion system where experience gained in seniority is utilized to perfect our procedures and concepts. We see, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Carter B. Magruder, one of

General Lutes's principal staff officers in the North Africa operation, cautioning that the massing of matériel had to be keyed into the availability of vessels to transport it. The warning was unheeded. The only curb on the accumulation of matériel was the stipulation that the task force commander had to justify the essentiality of new items. This and the constant changing and adding of items took their toll, resulting in disorderly dispatch of matériel and men.

Today, General Magruder, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, is in a position to do something—and is doing a great deal—to avoid the pitfalls he witnessed earlier in his career.

Certain references seem almost prophetic. Referring to the Casablanca operation, General Lutes, years later, complained that there had not been sufficient training in logistics at Army schools. Time was an important ingredient not sufficiently appreciated by the staff officers. "A few days were generally considered sufficient to move an Army in position, to bring up the ammunition, and to launch the Army into attack, but all the logistics that precede such an operation were unknown, or at least not taught."

This deficiency is being corrected today. A career for Army logisticians is being developed, and courses in logistics have been established and are being expanded.

We learn from experience, and certainly the Pentagon planners now have available in orderly and interesting fashion valuable logistical history in this work by Messrs. Leighton and Coakley.

Newfangled Jimcrack

LINCOLN'S CHOICE
By J. O. Buckeridge
The Stackpole Company, 1956
254 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

By a curious coincidence, two recently published books recall President Lincoln's personal interest and influence in developing better weapons for the Federal armed forces. The earlier book (Robert V. Bruce's *Lincoln and the Tools of War*) dealt with matériel of all kinds. Mr. Buckeridge is concerned with a single weapon, the Spencer repeating rifle, and above all with its effect on Civil War tactics beginning in a marked degree in the Gettysburg campaign. Although he is overly enthusiastic in seeking to prove his thesis that "the Spencer rifle was a major factor in Lee's defeat," his research in little known regimental and other grass-roots records uncovers interesting supporting evidence for his proposition.

The Spencer rifle increased fire power prodigiously. It substituted a metallic cartridge case for the clumsy paper cartridge

of the muzzle loader. Nevertheless, General Ripley, the Chief of Ordnance, didn't want it. He called it a "newfangled jimcrack," but the Navy fell in love with it at first sight and ordered a few thousand in 1861. After Lincoln, in August 1863, fired the Spencer in his own back yard—and Mr. Buckeridge's description of this White House proving ground is most interesting—the Spencer repeating rifle was ordered in quantity.

Topside generals may have been reluctant to introduce a new kind of infantry weapon to the Army. In the ranks, however, when this repeating rifle became known, there was a pathetic longing to get it. Mr. Buckeridge cites an almost incredible letter from a sergeant showing how eager were the Civil War infantrymen to acquire the Spencer. It is a valuable lesson for everyone having anything to do with weapons development. Here it is in all its startling implications:

"Chattanooga, Tenn., Sept. 19th, 1863.
"Spencer Repeating Rifle Company:

"Gentlemen:—I take liberty in writing and inquiring about your rifle as to the manufacturing prices, the number to be had, and the time they could be sent to us at Chattanooga. The whole regiment is willing to buy them and pay for them the next pay-day, as they will have four months pay coming to them, or the Colonel commanding the regiment would secure your pay; and I believe the whole of the 3rd Brigade of Sheridan's division would buy them if we get them.

"Yours respectfully,
JOHN E. EKSTRAND
"Regt. Ord. Sgt. 51st Illinois Volunteer
Infantry
3rd Brigade, 3rd Div., 20 A.C."

Battle experiences with the Spencer including especially Gettysburg, Chickamauga, the Wilderness, Sheridan's Valley campaign and Grant's last year leading to Appomattox, are cited from general officer to men in the ranks. They prove by vivid and convincing eyewitness accounts how an increased fire power from two aimed shots per minute with the standard muzzle loader to fifteen per minute with the Spencer, which also had longer range, helped Mr. Lincoln's armies to victory.

Mr. Buckeridge has served well the cause of better understanding of Civil War history. Too often the student of those campaigns forgets the influence of weapons on battlefield tactics which will be far more comprehensible to the reader of this carefully documented book. In spite of occasional errors and some extravagant claims for the Spencer, this story of a weapon and its tactical influence is useful as well as entertaining. It is likewise important in this era of rapid technological process. Let us keep in mind this report of General Custer

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• Selected Check List of the Month's Books •

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 72 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

ANGEL OF THE BATTLEFIELD: The Life of Clara Barton. By Ishbel Ross. Harper & Brothers, 1956. 305 Pages; Index; \$4.00. Soldiers who have come to expect helicopter evacuation and miracles of surgery and drugs would do well to read the battlefield care of less than a hundred years ago, and of the woman who devoted her life to easing suffering in war and other disasters. This biography of the founder of the American Red Cross does not have a "For Women Only" tag.

THE ANSWER. By Philip Wylie. Rinehart & Company, 1956. 63 Pages; \$1.50. A *Saturday Evening Post* story reprinted as a small, board-bound book. Two angels, or perhaps the same angel twice, complicate the analysis of H-bomb tests for the U.S. and the USSR. A mystic answer to the world's future.

ATOMIC ENERGY AND CONGRESS. By Morgan Thomas. 301 Pages; Index; \$4.75; **GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING IN ATOMIC ENERGY.** By Richard A. Tybout. 226 Pages; Index; \$4.50; University of Michigan Press, 1956. Two analytical texts; both are of particular interest to contractors who contemplate activities in the field. Gratifyingly readable.

EISENHOWER'S SIX GREAT DECISIONS: Europe, 1944-45. By Walter Bedell Smith. Longmans, Green & Company, 1956. 237 Pages; Index; \$3.95. An intimate revelation of the responsibilities of

high command in time of war, by one who was there. This explains both war and Eisenhower.

THE FATAL DECISIONS: The Battles of Britain, Moscow, El Alamein, Stalingrad, France 1944, the Ardennes. Edited by Seymour Freidin and William Richardson. William Sloane Associates, 1956. 302 Pages; Maps; Index; \$4.00. The men who lost the six great battles of World War II in Europe write their accounts of the actions. S. L. A. Marshall, our own official historian, finds the book important and revealing; the military student will find it instructive in addition.

LINCOLN'S CHOICE. By J. O. Buckridge. The Stackpole Company, 1956. 254 Pages; Index; \$5.00. The impact of the Spencer repeating rifle on the Civil War, written with anecdotes and descriptions that raise it far above the level of a story of ordnance.

RUSSIA AND AMERICA: Dangers and Prospects. By Henry L. Roberts. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, 1956. 251 Pages; \$3.50. Columbia historian, Director of the Russian Institute, reports his version of a two-year top-brain study group working on the long-term problems of foreign policy created by the Soviet new look.

SEA WAR: The Story of the U. S. Merchant Marine in World War II. By Felix

Riesenber, Jr. Rinehart & Company, 1956. 320 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00. Proof again that the Merchant Marine in World War II did a superior job under heartbreaking conditions. Tales of bravery, suffering and horror to match those of the armed services, integrated into a readable logistical study that has meaning for every soldier.

WEST POINT: The Life of a Cadet. A picture story by Jack Engeman. Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Company, 1956. 152 Pages; \$3.50. A photographic story of the Academy today; more than 250 photographs make it a value at the price.

WORLD AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION MANUAL. By C. H. Gibbs-Smith and L. E. Bradford. John de Graff, Inc., 1956. 269 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.50. The publishers promise that this is the first of a new series, to be brought up to date each year. Successor to *Aircraft Recognition Manual*, a standard work in the field. Photographs, silhouettes, and descriptions.

YOUTH: The Years from Ten to Sixteen. By Arnold Gesell, Frances L. Ilg and Louise B. Ames. Harper & Brothers, 1956. 542 Pages; Index; \$5.95. Those who tried to raise their children on the two previous books will be waiting for this volume of the series. Anything that helps the parent of a child in this age bracket should be welcome.

from the Gettysburg battlefield: "I attribute their [5th Michigan Cavalry] success," wrote General Custer, "to the fact that the regiment is armed with the Spencer repeating rifle, which in the hands of brave, determined men is the most effective firearm that our cavalry can adopt."

Bold and Aggressive

GRAY FOX: Robert E. Lee and the Civil War
By Burke Davis
Rinehart & Company
466 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.00

Reviewed by
COL. CHARLES W. McCARTHY

Through title alone Mr. Davis will not convince either contemporary or future students of history that General Lee's Civil War leadership can be characterized as "foxy." Certainly the work itself does not support that idea. In his foreword Mr. Burke offers a brief explanation of his reason for the title which to this reviewer is far from adequate. The splitting of forces on occasion and Lee's ability to forecast enemy intentions as in the moves to meet Grant in his sideslipping

progress from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor are possibly "foxy" traits. On the other hand, his willingness on many occasions to seek out the more formidable enemy and his refusal to run for cover when he knew he was outnumbered, which Mr. Davis amply records, continue the tradition of the bold, aggressive soldier willing to stand and fight but seldom if ever outmaneuvered.

But let not misuse of an engaging title condemn this book, which is a worthy addition to historical literature. Mr. Davis, in a comparatively short book, has given a complete and well-written account of Lee's Civil War years. This is not to be considered as supplanting the masterful work of Freeman nor designed to replace biographies written by Thomas Nelson Page or Winston, but rather is the kind of thing designed for the casual student of military history or the man with an interest in the generalship of Lee.

Biographies of Confederate leaders written by residents of the Southern States frequently deify the subject or surround it with such an aura of accomplish-

ment that the faults fail to show through. Not so Mr. Burke. The feet of clay are plainly evident, and Lee's generous, forgiving nature appears as a fault which was possibly his greatest weakness. His failure "to command" in the early days of the war in West Virginia, although "command" in that ill-organized tatterdemalion force was difficult, resulted in a fiasco and the loss to the Confederacy of that territory. Aggressiveness was a quality to be employed against the enemy. Within his own forces he relied, except in rare instances, on devotion to carry out his will. The author leaves one with the impression that Jackson, while accepting the decisions of the commander, was, except during the Seven Days, always party to the decision and the relationship was more on the basis of a partnership than a superior dealing with a subordinate.

One of the great features of this book is the manner in which the author has highlighted the principal battles and dealt but briefly with the minor actions of subordinate commanders. Chancellorsville and Sharpsburg are excellent. Here is

truly the great generalship of Lee. While the trite subject of Gettysburg, with Lee's evident failure, is well covered, the author does not excuse his hero but still leaves one with the question of why the lack of control at this crucial stage when Lee seemed to recapture it in the fine defensive effort of the Wilderness. One gathers the impression that Lee's constant reference to "young men" and his poor health indicated that age and illness were draining his aggressive spirit; yet there were flashes of it when he authorized Gordon's abortive sortie against the Union works at Petersburg and in his final proposals to Davis when he realized that Petersburg and consequently Richmond must be evacuated.

Now that the Civil War is receding into the distant past and the standard maps at Leavenworth and Benning are no longer that of Gettysburg, it is difficult for young people of this generation to become acquainted with that great episode of our military history. Steele, Freeman and even Kenneth Williams are beyond the purse and reading time of the majority. And yet knowledge of that great tradition, militarily as well as politically, is essential for proper understanding of what we are and what we stand for. Mr. Burke has produced an accurate, concise history which will keep alive not only the knowledge of many of the princ'pal actions of our Civil War but also brings a definite freshness to the memory of one of our great military leaders.

Operator and Wolf

SICKLES THE INCREDIBLE

By W. A. Swanberg

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956

433 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.00

Reviewed by
N. J. ANTHONY

Daniel Edgar Sickles got into the Civil War early. He raised New York's Excelsior Brigade, thereby entitling him to the rank of brigadier general, as was the fashion. He fought in the Virginia campaigns, and became a friend of Joe Hooker, who knew how to take care of friends. Sickles became the major general commanding III Corps. His handling of this corps at Gettysburg is what aroused so much criticism of him. Instead of placing it, as was the plan, in prolongation to the Taneytown road to extend the shank of the Union fishhook and tying in its left (south) flank with Little Round Top, he moved it forward to the Emmitsburg road where at the Peach Orchard it broke off from and was in advance of the rest of the Union line, forming a salient both flanks of which could be enfiladed. Fortunately, the Confederates failed to occupy Little Round Top and Warren seized it. Sickles maintained to his last day that his handling of III Corps was correct, though he didn't

see the battle through. He lost a leg there which he had embalmed and placed in a miniature coffin and shipped to Washington. You can see the bones at the Armed Forces Medical Museum.

Sickles never commanded again during the war. He was shunted from one mission to another by a President who knew how to politely kick people upstairs. After the war he commanded the occupation forces in South Carolina, with more understanding than was exercised in other places.

Mr. Swanberg's biography is a fine treatment of a life that was in many ways incredible, not so much for what Sickles did as how he did it, for the man's conceit and gall were boundless. Today's soldiers would label him an operator and a wolf, for his life was an endless series of political and financial deals that were shady and affairs with ladies that were the same. At a Court function he had the brass to introduce one of the "ladies" to Queen Victoria as the daughter of his enemy, James Gordon Bennett. He began political life at an early age, and was in Congress when, almost on the White House lawn, he murdered the son of Francis Scott Key who had cuckolded him. The Sickles trial was the first in history where insanity was used as a successful defense.

After the war Sickles wangled from Grant a place on the Army's retired list as major general. Later appointed Minister to Spain, while there he intrigued for American interference in Cuba and commuted to Paris where he openly carried on an affair with the deposed Queen of Spain which earned him the popular title of Yankee King of Spain. He remarried, but he left in Spain a wife he never saw again for twenty-seven years. Sickles was ever in the scandal sheets of his day. His greatest triumph (after Gettysburg, of course!) was in smashing the Jay Gould group's hold on the Erie Railroad. But Sickles died broke, having gone through a fortune of more than four million.

For all his military ineptness, Sickles never lacked in physical courage on the battlefield or off it. In his military career as well as in his political life he had a way with men in spite of his reputation as a rake. We might even forgive his part in the shabby effort to discredit Meade and to have himself recognized as the real victor at Gettysburg, for it was due to his efforts that the place is today a national monument. But then he might have been thinking of it as a monument to Dan Sickles.

There is one error in the book, probably written in by an editor of recent service. So that they could be seen from horseback, corps and division insignia were worn on the hat and cap, not on the left shoulder. That practice didn't begin until after World War I was well under way.

LET'S GET GOING

(Continued from Page 43)

combat groupment as an entity. This is but one example of how we can group the weapons we now have to gain maximum effectiveness under special conditions of the battlefield.

As we develop these formations we will constantly see the need for additional weapons and equipment. The armored personnel carrier is a good example of this. Visual signaling equipment, panels, directional signal lamps, luminous paint, and pyrotechnics must be considered.

ALL this is but a suggestion for the solution of a particularly knotty but stimulating problem. The Army, of late, has been criticized for failing to organize its forces to fit existing development of weapons. We have tested proposed reorganization of infantry and armored divisions during Exercises Blue Bolt, Follow Me and Sage Brush. The results of these tests are currently being evaluated, but whatever the outcome, reorganization cannot take place overnight.

Meanwhile, infantry divisions can formulate SOPs for the organization and training of mobile forces within their current means. We must do everything possible in field experimentation along these lines to contribute a broad cross section of thought to a common problem. We can organize for combat around our most modern weapons, stressing mobility, heavy fire power well forward, weapons in thought-out combinations, flexibility, control, alternate means of communication and strong, educated, determined leadership.

All this effort can greatly stimulate all of us in the Army. Every commander in his own echelon, as with every unit in the Army, must consider the problem that faces him. With the rapidly changing potentials which science gives us there will always be matters requiring continuing study. We foresee mobility which will parallel this split-second age. We are sure that conventional weapons will be improved. These and our atomic potential must be considered together. Highly trained, alert and intelligent manpower armed with all the aids science can give us, is the answer to the problems that face us.

Let's get going!



Report from your AUSA CP

Your Executive Council held a short but important special meeting at the Pentagon 25 May. Purpose of the meeting was to examine list of nominees for Council of Trustees and Advisory Board of Directors, as submitted by Nominating Committee. These two bodies will govern Association under new organization which goes into effect in October. Two lists had been "fly-specked" by Council members before meeting; in short half-hour discussion several names were added, one deleted, and Committee was given authority to arrange names in order of priority to receive invitations to serve. The list is impressive, will add prestige and high-level brainpower to Association's new look.

Regular quarterly meeting of Executive Council scheduled for 14 June--after this issue goes to press. You will get resume of actions at this meeting in following issue of ARMY.

Sale of warehouse behind Association's former building on Seventeenth Street is latest move in Association's consolidation of assets. Under mandate from Council to "get out of real estate business," your Secretary sold another warehouse in 1954, signed contract for sale of this one 26 May. This places all Association activities at 18th Street address; will crowd storage space for a while but fits in with action to reduce inventories. Saving in taxes, interest, will be appreciable.

The superior organizations are usually superior in all departments. In the April issue we told about the 60th CA(AA), under fire on Corregidor, sending in the necessary applications and checks to maintain its 100% standing with the Coast Artillery Association. Comes now the 7278th GU Transportation Terminal Command, with headquarters in Newfoundland, busily preparing for an arduous summer along the DEW line and in other

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"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components and providing for and assuring the Nation's military security." (Statement by the Executive Council, Association of the U. S. Army; adopted 14 December 1953.)

portions of the Arctic, taking time out to become a 100% unit in your Association. Col. C. J. Rinker, Commanding, advises that 100% of the career officers in the 7278th are now members of the Association.

Assigned to Northeast Air Command, the 7278th began its Arctic existence when the 373d Transportation Port Command was called to duty in 1950, to work on Operation Bluejay. The 373d returned to Reserve status in 1955 and the 7278th was activated. The 7278th deals in large figures, such as 2,000,000 tons of cargo over an area of 500,000 square miles with 1900 miles between its southernmost and northernmost ports--and 100% membership in the Association. Welcome to the very exclusive 100% club, 7278!

Photorecord charts, appearing in ARMY from time to time, are making new friends for Association. Industry, military headquarters, political figures find them useful, write in for reprints. These charts are only one item in long list of activities your Association is developing to educate public leaders in role and function of the Army.

Interest in Annual Meeting, scheduled for 25, 26, 27 October, increases in all sectors. Industry participation exceeds expectations and comes close to meeting hopes; Association members from CONUS and overseas write for information. Watch ARMY for registration information; it's possible that those who wait until last moment may find neither quarters nor space at Association functions. Registration applications will be processed in order of receipt.

Have you bought a book lately? The Association's Book Service is set up to assist those officers who are stationed in places that are remote from good civilian bookstores. Our job is to get you the books you need, as promptly as we can. We offer members a 10% discount (take your discount before you send in your money) and we pay the postage. The books listed on the last two pages in the magazine are kept in stock at all times, and can be shipped immediately. Other titles may take a while longer; publishers don't always ship the day the order is received. The Association's book activity is a service; take advantage of it.

We're often asked about origins of Association, reasons for change in name of magazine. We understand confusion of newer members, and of former members of Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Antiaircraft Associations. Short history is as follows: AUSA formed 6 July 1950 by merger of U.S. Infantry Association and U.S. Field Artillery Association. U.S. Antiaircraft Association joined team 1 January 1955. Combat Forces Journal name was adopted at time of first merger in 1950. Name of magazine changed to ARMY with February, 1956, issue to indicate broadened aims of Association and publication.

Both Infantry, Antiaircraft, go back to 1892. Infantry Society formed in that year; name changed to U.S. Infantry Association in 1904. Journal of U.S. Infantry Association began publication in 1904; name changed to Infantry Journal in 1906. Journal of U.S. Artillery began publication also in 1892. Name changed to Coast Artillery Journal in 1922; U.S. Coast Artillery Association formed in 1930. Name of magazine changed to Antiaircraft Journal in 1948; name of association changed to conform in 1950. Field Artillery Association formed in 1910; Field Artillery Journal began publication in 1911.

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